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ABSTRACT
This  paper  develops  a  framework  to  analyze  the  relationship  between  the  diffusion  of  new
technologies  and  the  decentralization  decisions  of  firms.    Centralized  control  relies  on  the
information of the principal, which we equate with publicly available information.  However, the
manager can use her informational advantage to make choices that are not in the best interest of the
principal.  As the available public information about the specific technology increases, the trade-off
shifts in favor of centralization.  We show that firms closer to the technological frontier, firms in
more heterogeneous environments and younger firms are more likely to choose decentralization.
Using three datasets of French and British firms in the 1990s we report robust correlations consistent
with these predictions.
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Recent years have witnessed increasing interest in the determinants of ¯rms' organizational
choices. This interest is partly motivated by the belief that recent technological developments
are favoring more decentralized ¯rms. Summarizing the conventional wisdom, Business Week
wrote: \Globalization and the arrival of the information economy have rapidly demolished all
the old precepts. The management of global companies, which must innovate simultaneously
and speed information through horizontal globe-spanning networks, has become a daunting
challenge. Old, rigid hierarchies are out ....".1 Despite this interest, there is limited work on
the determinants of the decentralization decisions of ¯rms.
This paper undertakes a theoretical and empirical investigation of how the allocation of
authority within ¯rms changes as the information structure in an industry evolves. We de-
velop a simple model where ¯rms make choices under incomplete information regarding the
(correct, most productive) implementation of new technologies. Di®erent organizational forms
are distinguished by the amount of information they use in these decisions. As in Aghion and
Tirole (1997), centralized control relies more on the information of the principal, which we
equate with publicly available information, especially concerning past implementations of the
same or similar technologies. Decentralized control delegates authority to a specialized agent
(manager), who potentially possesses more information than available in the public history.
However, because the interests of the principal and the manager are not perfectly aligned, the
agent can also use her informational advantage to make choices that are not in the best interest
of the principal. This trade-o® determines the optimal degree of decentralization. The main
focus of our analysis is how learning from the experiences of other ¯rms changes this trade-
o®. In particular, as the available public information about the speci¯c technology increases,
the trade-o® shifts in favor of centralization. In contrast, when dealing with new technologies
decentralization may be preferable.
Using this basic framework we derive three sets of empirical predictions:
1. Firms closer to the technological frontier are more likely to choose decentralization, be-
cause they are dealing with new technologies about which there is only limited informa-
tion in the public history.
1Business Week The 21st Century Corporation, cover story August 21-28, 2000.
12. Firms in more heterogeneous environments are more likely to be decentralized, because
learning from the experience of others is more di±cult.
3. Young ¯rms, that have had a limited history to learn about their own speci¯c needs, are
also more likely to be decentralized than older ¯rms.
The bulk of the paper investigates these predictions using two large datasets of French ¯rms
and establishments and one smaller set of British establishments in the 1990s. We document
a number of conditional correlations that are consistent with the predictions of the theory.
Speci¯cally, we ¯nd that ¯rms closer to the technology frontier of their industry and younger
¯rms are more likely to choose decentralize.
We also document that there is a signi¯cant relationship between heterogeneity and de-
centralization, which is a distinctive prediction of our approach. Our main measure of het-
erogeneity is the variation in ¯rm-level productivity growth within a four-digit sector. We
also consider alternative measures such as the IT weighted \distance" between the product
mix of a ¯rm and those by other ¯rms in the sample. The results suggest that ¯rms in more
heterogeneous environments are more likely to choose decentralization.
In addition, since our theoretical approach emphasizes the importance of learning about the
implementation of new technologies, we also look at high-tech industries separately. Consistent
with our theoretical approach, we ¯nd that the relationship between heterogeneity or distance
to frontier and decentralization is stronger in high-tech than in low-tech industries.
While most of the empirical results in the paper should be interpreted as correlations,
the predictions of our theoretical approach concern the causal e®ect of heterogeneity and
distance to frontier on decentralization. To remove some of the most obvious sources of omitted
variable biases and reverse causality, we present instrumental variable estimates on the French
data using matched industry information from the UK over the same time period. These
instrumental variable estimates largely support the baseline results that treat heterogeneity
and distance to the frontier as exogenous.
Our main measure of decentralization is whether di®erent units of the ¯rm are organized
into \pro¯t centers" (see below for further discussion). We show that our results on hetero-
geneity and distance to frontier are robust to using alternative measures of decentralization,
including measures of delayering and managerial autonomy in investment decisions (the age
results are somewhat weaker with some of these alternative measures).
Finally, we further substantiate the results using a smaller dataset of British ¯rms, with
similar questions on decentralization. The estimates from the British dataset also show similar
2patterns.
On the theoretical side, our paper is most closely related to the literature on the costs and
bene¯ts of delegation or decentralization in ¯rms. A ¯rst strand in that literature, for example
Baron and Besanko (1992) and Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1995), investigated
the conditions for delegated contracting to replicate the constrained e±cient contracting. As
emphasized by Mookherjee (2005), however, the presence of complete contracts in these models
implies that delegation can at best replicate the constrained e±cient allocation, which is also
achievable by centralized contracting. A second strand emphasizes information processing and
communication costs as determinants of centralization or decentralization in ¯rms. Key papers
in this strand include Sah and Stiglitz (1986), Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991), Radner (1992,
1993), Radner and Van Zandt (1992), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), and Garicano (2000).
Although we also emphasize the importance of information and learning, our approach is
di®erent, since it focuses on the e®ect of information on the relationship between the principal
and the agent, and how much autonomy the principal would like to grant to the agent. Closer to
the model in our paper are the recent papers emphasizing the trade-o® between loss of control
and better information under decentralization|in particular, Aghion and Tirole (1997), Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy (1999), Rajan and Zingales (2001), Dessein (2002), and Hart and Moore
(2005).2 The main di®erences between these papers and ours are twofold: ¯rst, because there
are no incentive e®ects of the form of the organization, our framework is signi¯cantly simpler
and allows us to focus on the basic trade-o® between information and loss of control; second;
we allow the principal to learn from other ¯rms' or from their own past experience, which is
the source of all the comparative static results we investigate in the empirical work.3
The main contribution of our paper is the empirical evidence we provide on the determinants
of decentralization. The existing empirical literature on the subject focuses on the general move
towards\°atter"organizations.4 Rajan and Wulf (2005) provide the most systematic statistical
2Aghion and Tirole (1997) emphasize the trade-o® between loss of control and the agent's ex ante incentives
to acquire information under decentralization. Hart and Moore (2005) show how the trade-o® between loss of
control and information can explain why in many hierarchies generalists command specialists. Dessein (2002)
develops a model in which decentralization to the agent entails a loss of control for the principal, but at the
same time reduces the agent's incentive to miscommunicate her information to the principal.
3Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999) present a di®erent model where endogenous accumulation of information
a®ects the internal organization of ¯rms. In their model, a larger number of ¯rms in the economy enables better
relative performance of evaluation and creates a shift from direct to indirect monitoring. The number of ¯rms
in the economy is, in turn, determined endogenously as a function of the stage of development and the level of
the capital stock.
4This phenomenon is described by di®erent terms in di®erent contexts, including decentralization, delayering
and delegation. In the theory, consistent with the principal-agent literature, we use the term\delegation", while
in the empirical analysis, we adopt the terms used in the datasets, namely\decentralization"in the ¯rst dataset
and \delayering" in the second.
3description of recent organizational trends, showing a strong movement towards °atter corpo-
rations in the United States between 1986 and 1999. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002)
and Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) report a positive association between various measures of
decentralization and organizational change on the one hand and information technology (and
human capital) on the other. Baker and Hubbard (2003, 2004) document the e®ect of new
technologies (on-board computers) on ownership patterns in the US trucking industry. In ad-
dition, Colombo and Delmastro (2004) present empirical models of decentralization in Italian
manufacturing plants, Lerner and Merges (1998) examine the allocation of control rights in
biotechnology alliances, and Black and Lynch (2001), Ichinowski et al (1997) and Janod and
Saint-Martin (2004) examine the impact of human resource practices and ¯rm reorganization
on productivity. None of these papers investigate the relationship between decentralization (or
more generally organizational change) and distance to frontier or heterogeneity.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some preliminary
data description to motivate the basic theoretical framework, which is presented in Section 3.
Section 4 describes our main econometric speci¯cations and data. Section 5 presents the
empirical results. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains the proofs from Section 3, while
Appendices B and C contain additional data description and robustness checks.
2 Basic Patterns
To motivate our focus in the paper and the theory, we ¯rst present some salient patterns from a
database of several thousand French manufacturing ¯rms, the\Changements Organisationnels
et Informatisation"(COI). This dataset, as well as another French dataset (Enqu^ ete Reponse)
covering manufacturing and non-manufacturing establishments and a similar British dataset
(the Workplace Employee Relations Survey), will be described below. For now, it su±ces to
note that our key indicator for decentralization from the COI is whether a ¯rm is organized
primarily into pro¯t centers or whether it is more centrally controlled with divisions organized
as a cost or production centers. A manager of a pro¯t center is concerned with all aspects
of the business that contribute to pro¯tability. Managers in charge of production centers
focus on output targets and managers of costs centers target costs. When a ¯rm organizes its
divisions into pro¯t centers, it has delegated substantially more authority to its managers (see
the discussion in Section 4).
Figures 1-3 show the proportion of over 3,570 ¯rms that are decentralized into pro¯t centers
broken down by various ¯rm characteristics. Figure 1 divides ¯rms into deciles depending on
the \heterogeneity" of the ¯rm's environment. Heterogeneity is measured as the dispersion in
4¯rm productivity growth rates in each four-digit industry. Productivity growth is measured as
the growth in value added per hour and the dispersion measure is the inter-decile range (i.e.,
the di®erence between log productivity growth at the 90th and that at the 10th percentiles,
see equation (11) below). This variable and its construction are discussed in greater detail in
Section 4.
Figure 1 shows a general increase in the probability of decentralization as we move from
the ¯rms in the least heterogeneous industries (in the second decile 22% of the ¯rms are de-
centralized) to the most heterogeneous industries (in the tenth decile 41% of the ¯rms are
decentralized). The ¯rst decile is somewhat anomalous, but closer investigation shows a dis-
proportionately large number of less productive and older ¯rms in these sectors, aspects which
we now turn to.
Figure 2 plots the fraction of ¯rms decentralized into pro¯t centers against the \proximity
to the frontier" (measured as the ratio of the ¯rm's value added per hour to the value added
per hour of the ¯rm at the 99th percentile of the distribution in the same four-digit industry).
27% of the ¯rms in the bottom quintile of the proximity distribution (i.e., those who are most
distant from the frontier) are decentralized, while 38% of the ¯rms in the top quintile are
decentralized (i.e., those who are closest to the frontier).
Finally, Figure 3 depicts the relationship between decentralization and ¯rm age and shows
that younger ¯rms are, on average, more decentralized than older ¯rms: about 45% of the
¯rms under the age of ¯ve years are decentralized compared to a rate of 30% for the older
¯rms.
These correlations therefore suggest that ¯rms that operate in more heterogeneous envi-
ronments, that are closer to the technological frontier, and that are younger are more likely
to be decentralized. While these patterns may be consistent with a variety of di®erent ap-
proaches, they are also indicative of a relationship between information and decentralization.
We expect ¯rms in more heterogeneous environments, those closer to the technology frontier
and younger ¯rms to face greater uncertainty regarding the optimal implementation of new
technologies than ¯rms that are in more homogeneous environments, farther from the fron-
tier and more experienced. This motivates our simple theoretical approach emphasizing the
relationship between learning and decentralization, which is presented in the next section.
3 Theory
In this section, we describe the theory and derive some testable implications.
53.1 Environment
The economy is populated by a set F of ¯rms. Time is discrete. New technologies k = 1;2;:::
become available sequentially and randomly to ¯rms. As a new opportunity of technology
adoption materializes, ¯rms must choose the form of its implementation. In each period, one
(and only one) new technology becomes available to the ¯rm i 2 F with positive probability
pi 2 (0;1]. The speed at which new opportunities become available can di®er across ¯rms,
and pi measures the speed at which ¯rm i climbs the technology ladder. The realizations of
technological opportunities are independent across ¯rms and over time.
Each technology can be implemented successfully or unsuccessfully. The successful imple-
mentation of a technology increases the ¯rm's productivity by a factor ° > 1, while unsuccessful
implementation leaves the productivity of the ¯rm unchanged. So the law of motion of ¯rm
i's productivity is given by
yi;t = °Si(t)yi;t¡1; (1)
where yi;t is the productivity (and revenue) of the ¯rm at time t and Si (t) is an indicator
function taking the value 1 if a technological opportunity arises for ¯rm i at time t and is
successfully implemented, and zero otherwise. Whether the technology is successful or not
depends on an action taken by the ¯rm, which we denote by xi;k;t 2 fL;R;?g, with xi;k;t = ?
standing for not attempting the technology, and L and R denoting two alternative ways of
implementing the new technology, or two\actions". We will see below that the ¯rm will never
choose xi;k;t = ?, so the relevant choice is between L and R. One of these two actions, denoted
by x¤
i;k 2 fL;Rg, leads to successful implementation, while the other leads to an unsuccessful
outcome. We will refer to the action leading to successful implementation as the correct action.
We model the correct action as follows: for each technology k there exists a reference action
x¤





k with probability 1 ¡ "
» x¤
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; (2)
where x¤
i;k denotes the correct action for ¯rm i in implementing technology k and » x¤
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6This speci¯cation implies that there is a generally correct way of implementing each tech-
nology, given by the reference action, but idiosyncratic di®erences between ¯rms's needs and
competencies may imply that some ¯rms need to take a di®erent action in order to be success-
ful with this technology. Equation (2) makes it clear that " is a measure of the heterogeneity
among ¯rms. When " is close to zero, the reference action is the correct action for almost all
¯rms, while when " is close to 1/2, the correct action di®ers substantially across ¯rms.
Finally, each ¯rm is owned by a principal, who maximizes the present discounted value
(PDV) of pro¯ts, with discount factor ¯ 2 (0;1), conditional on information, ht; and their
initial productivity, yi;t¡1 < 1. For now, we ignore any costs on the side of ¯rms, so pro¯ts
















The above speci¯cation makes it clear that it is always advantageous for the ¯rm to im-
plement a technology whenever it becomes available, so we can restrict attention to xi;k;t 2
fL;Rg.5 Consequently, a ¯rm's productivity and value will depend on how many technolo-
gies have become available in the past to this ¯rm and how successful the ¯rm has been in
implementing them.
Success in the implementation of technologies depends on the organization of the ¯rm. The
two alternative organizational forms available to each ¯rm are: centralization and delegation.
In the ¯rst, the principal (owner) manages the ¯rm and chooses the action xi;k, while in the
second, the action choice is delegated to a manager.
The principal has no special skills in identifying the right action, so she bases her decision on
the publicly available information ht. Without loss of any generality, for the decision regarding
technology k, we can restrict attention to the history that is payo® relevant to technology k.
Moreover, throughout we will focus on a (representative) ¯rm i that has access to technology
k at time t. In this case, with a slight abuse of terminology, we will refer to the payo®-relevant
history for the implementation of technology k as a history hi
k. As shown more formally
in subsection 3.3 below, under centralization the principal will choose xi;t;k = L when the
posterior that x¤










k = L j hi
k
¢
5By delaying the implementation of technology k available at date t, the ¯rm may obtain more information
about this technology, but by assumption, it will never have an opportunity to adopt this technology again.
Instead, at t + 1, technology k + 1 would become available to ¯rm i with probability pi.
7is greater than 1/2. We discuss the derivation of this posterior further below.
In contrast to the principal, we assume that the manager observes x¤
i;k, so that he knows
exactly which action will lead to successful implementation. However, the manager of ¯rm i
may have interests that are not aligned with those of the owner. Following Aghion and Tirole
(1997), we model this in a reduced form way, and assume that the most preferred action for





i;k with probability ±
» x¤
i;k with probability 1 ¡ ±
(4)
where ± measures the congruence between the ¯rm's and the manager's objectives. If xi;k = z¤
i;k,
the manager obtains a private bene¯t Byi;t¡1. Notice that equation (4) implies that the
manager is informed about the right action for this particular ¯rm, not (or not simply) the
right reference action.
We introduce a number of simplifying assumptions, which enable us to focus on the main
e®ects we would like to highlight. First, we assume that the relationship between the ¯rm
and each manager is short-term (for example, because the manager has special skills which are
useful with a speci¯c vintage of technology). Second, managers have zero outside option, are
credit-constrained and cannot compensate principals for the private bene¯t they receive from
choosing their preferred action. This assumption also implies that whether the ¯rm delegates
control when there is no new technology to be implemented is of no consequence. Finally, we
assume that B is su±ciently large that it is not pro¯table for the principal to use an incentive
contract to induce the manager to take the right action, and given this large private bene¯t,
the principal also need not make any additional payments to the manager (this assumption is
relaxed in Appendix A). Consequently, delegation implies that the action most preferred by




± 2 (1=2;1 ¡ "):
The ¯rst part of the assumption, ± > 1=2, means that the manager's interests are more
likely to be aligned with that of the principal than otherwise, so that delegation improves the
6Put di®erently, in this model the choice between centralization and delegation simply corresponds to whether
the\advice"or information of the manager is followed or not. In particular, all the results would be identical if we
imagined a di®erent game form in which the manager reports his recommendation and then the principal decides
which action to take. In this di®erent game form, the equilibrium would be identical to the one we consider
here, and \delegation" would correspond to the principal following the recommendation of the manager.
8¯rm's decision-making relative to the principal deciding without any information. The second
part, ± < 1 ¡ ", implies that the con°ict of interest between the principal and the manager is
su±ciently severe that a principal who knows the reference action is more likely to make the
correct choice herself than the manager. This assumption generates an interesting trade-o®
between the two organizational forms.
3.2 Organizational Choice
We denote by di;k 2 f0;1g the organization of ¯rm i facing an opportunity to implement
technology k. Throughout, we suppress time dependence whenever this causes no confusion.
Here di;k = 0 stands for centralization and di;k = 1 for delegation. Both choices (organization
and action) depend on the available stock of public information that is relevant for the ¯rm to
infer the reference action for technology k.
We assume that all actions by other ¯rms in the past are publicly observable. This implies
that history hi
k includes all previous attempts with technology k, which actions were chosen and
whether they led to successful implementation. Since conditional on x¤
k the success or failure
of di®erent ¯rms in the past are independent, all payo® relevant information is summarized by
two integers: the number of ¯rms that have attempted to implement this technology before
¯rm i denoted by ni
k, and the number of ¯rms for whom L turned out the pro¯table action,
denoted by ~ ni
k · ni
k.7
The ¯rst important point to note is that ni
k is a direct measure of distance to the technology
frontier.8 If ni
k is high, it means that by the time ¯rm i is considering the implementation
of technology k that many other ¯rms have already implemented it.9 Therefore, comparative
statics with respect to ni
k will give us predictions regarding the e®ect of the distance to the
technology frontier.
The second important point is that since ~ ni
k is the number of successes out of ni
k in a








: Since the choice of organization depends on the public information, we






7Note that ~ n
i
k is the sum of the number of ¯rms that have adopted technology k before i and chose xi0;k = L
and were successful plus the number of ¯rms that chose xi0;k = R and were unsuccessful. The public information
set also includes the organizational form chosen by ¯rms that have previously adopted technology k, but equation
(4) implies that ~ n
i
k is a su±cient statistic for this information.
8In the theory section, we state the results in terms of \distance to the technology frontier," while in the
empirical work it will be more convenient to use an inverse measure, \proximity to the frontier".
9This, in turn, is more likely when the probability pi that ¯rm i will have access to the next previously-
unavailable technology is relatively small. It is thus straightforward to see that E(n
i
k;t j pi) is a decreasing
function of pi for given t.
9With this speci¯cation, an optimal strategy for each ¯rm is straightforward to specify.
Given an opportunity to implement technology k, the ¯rm will decide an organization di;k 2
f0;1g and an action xi;k 2 fL;Rg as functions of history hi
k so as to maximize (3), with the
understanding that if di;k = 1, the action will be chosen by the manager. More formally, let
Ht
k be the set of all possible histories at time t regarding technology k. Then a strategy for the







k ! f0;1g £ fL;Rg, i.e., for every possible history at time t
for any technology k that could be available to the ¯rm, an optimal strategy speci¯es whether
the principal will delegate control to a manager, and if she does not do so, what action she will








denote the posterior probability that the ¯rm chooses the correct action condi-
tional on the history hi






under the two organizational forms, delegation and centralization (Lemmas 1 and






(Lemma 3). Finally, we turn to the main testable implications of the theory,
linking distance to frontier (ni
k) and heterogeneity (") to the probability that ¯rms choose
either delegation or centralization (Propositions 1 and 2).
When the principal delegates the implementation of a new technology to an informed







If, on the other hand, the principal retains authority, the probability of success is a stochastic
variable that depends on hi
k, thus both on the ¯rm's distance to the frontier, ni
k, and on the
experiences of ¯rms further ahead, captured by the number of ¯rms ~ ni
k out of ni
k for whom L






Lemma 1 Given a history hi
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10is the posterior probability that the right choice is L:






















¸ 1=2, the ¯rm correctly infers
that the reference action is L and the reference action coincides with the correct action. The





< 1=2, the ¯rm incorrectly infers that the
reference action is R and the reference action does not coincide with the correct action (hence,
due to a double mistake, the ¯rms makes the successful adoption).





in (7) follows from the Bayes' rule, given the Bernoulli assumption





is a random variable that depends on the realization of the stochastic
vector hi
k. Since hi
k consists of a deterministic component, ni
k, and a stochastic one, ~ ni
k, we













expectation is taken over possible realizations of ~ ni
k.
The following lemma establishes how this conditional expectation changes with ni
k and the





. In the rest of the analysis, without loss of any generality, we assume
that x¤
k = L.











conditional on sample size ni
k and
suppose that x¤



















Lemma 2 establishes the intuitive result that, as the history relevant to technology k ex-
pands, the principal learns the reference action x¤
k with increasing precision.






: Although ¯rms have a dynamic objective function, given by (3), the
maximization program is equivalent to a sequence of static problems. Intuitively, the current
organization choice only a®ects the PDV of the ¯rm via its e®ect on current productivity, yi;t,
so the optimal strategy simply maximizes the probability of successful implementation of new
technologies in each period.




































11In particular, given history hi




























is given by (6).
Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 enable us to characterize how the organizational form changes with
distance to frontier, ni
k; and heterogeneity, ". Consider, ¯rst, distance to frontier. Suppose, in
particular, that a ¯rm is at the technology frontier, so that it is the ¯rst ¯rm implementing
technology k. In this case, ni










= q0 = 1=2 < ±. Thus,







consider the other extreme where the ¯rm is far behind the technology frontier, so that many






















= 0. This discussion establishes the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Distance to Frontier) Consider the adoption decision of technology k by
¯rm i, and suppose that Assumption 1 holds and x¤
k = L. Then:
(i) For a ¯rm at the frontier, i.e., ni







(ii) For a ¯rm su±ciently far from the frontier, i.e., ni
k ! 1 , the principal chooses almost


















is increasing in ni
k (Lemma 2), one might
expect a more general result, such that as distance to frontier ni
k increases, decentralization
becomes more likely. Unfortunately, though intuitive, this result is not correct because of
integer issues. To illustrate the problem, consider Figure 4, which plots the probability of
centralization as a function of ni
k from an example with ± = 0:65 and " = 0:3. As implied
by Proposition 1, delegation is always chosen for ni
k · 2 and never chosen as ni
k exceeds 30.
In between, however, due to integer problems the relationship is non-monotonic.11 Clearly, if
one smooths out the plot taking a moving average, the probability of centralization is indeed
increasing with ni
k. Therefore, in the empirical analysis, we disregard the integer problem and
focus on the prediction that centralization increases with the distance to the frontier. We will
proxy distance to the frontier with the gap between the productivity of a ¯rm and the highest
productivity (or more precisely the highest percentile productivity) in the same industry. It
is clear that ¯rms further from the frontier in terms of having high ni
k's are less productive,
11In particular, when n
t
k = 3, delegation is chosen when ~ n
t
k = 1 or when ~ n
t
k = 2, so that the probability
of centralization overall is approximately 0.37. On the other hand, when n
t
k = 4, delegation is chosen for
~ n
t
k 2 f1;2;3g, and the probability of centralization is approximately 0.25. Thus, the probability of centralization
is smaller for n
t
k = 4 than for n
t
k = 3.
12since these are the ¯rms that have been unlucky and have had fewer opportunities to adopt
technologies, and they are also likely to be the ones with relatively low pi's, that is, those that
are slower in climbing their technology ladder.










as the ex ante probability
that ¯rm i facing technology k at time t will choose decentralization. This probability is
clearly a function of the parameters of the model, in particular ", which measures the extent of
heterogeneity, and the ¯rm's distance to frontier. In particular, recall that greater " translates
into a greater heterogeneity in the ¯rm's environment. The following proposition establishes
that greater heterogeneity|higher "|encourages decentralization (proof in Appendix A):
Proposition 2 (Heterogeneity) Consider the adoption decision of technology k by ¯rm i.













so that an increase in " makes delegation more likely.
Intuitively, when " is small, the performance of ¯rms that have implemented the same
technology in the past reveals more information about the reference action. Thus, ¯rms'
posterior beliefs are more responsive to public information. Note that this applies to both
\correct"and\incorrect"beliefs. For instance, suppose that x¤
k = L, but in the sample available
to the ¯rm R has been successful more than half of the time; then, when " is small, the ¯rm
will assign higher probability to R being the correct action (i.e., ¼
¡
0;hi
k j xi;k = R
¢
will take
on a larger value). The complication in establishing Proposition 2 comes from the fact that a
change in " a®ects the likelihood of di®erent histories. Nevertheless, Appendix A establishes












Proposition 2 provides the most interesting testable implication of our approach; it suggests
that there should be more decentralization in industries with greater dispersion of performance
across ¯rms and also for ¯rms that are more dissimilar to others.
3.4 Delegation and Age
Finally, we brie°y extend our basic model to derive a relationship between ¯rm age and orga-
nizational structure. In the model analyzed so far the deviation between the reference action
and the correct action for each ¯rm was independently and identically distributed across tech-
nologies, ¯rms and time. Consequently, a ¯rm's information on how to implement technology
13k was independent from that ¯rm's actions and performance on previous technologies k0 < k:
More generally, one could assume that there is a positive correlation between the correct ac-
tions that a ¯rm should take across successive technologies, for example, because the speci¯c
skills of the employees or the culture of the organization di®er across ¯rms. In this case, the
¯rm could learn from its own past experience as well as from the experiences of other ¯rms.12
Since solving the signal extraction problem with multiple sources of uncertainty is compli-
cated and not our main focus here, we assume in this subsection that ¯rms cannot learn from
other ¯rms. This enables us to focus instead on ¯rms' learning from their own performance.





i with probability 1 ¡ "i
» x¤
i with probability "i
;
so that the reference action for ¯rm i is x¤
i 2 fL;Rg, the correct action for technology k may
di®er from this with some probability "i < 1=2.
This equation implies that the updating problem is now identical to that discussed previ-
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ª
, where, given Ii (k;t) = 1, nk
i denotes the
number of technologies that ¯rm i has implemented before technology k, and ~ nk
i denotes the
number of times in which action L turned out to be the correct choice in this ¯rm's own expe-
rience in the past. Given this reinterpretation, our previous analysis implies (proof omitted):
Proposition 3 (Age) Consider the adoption decision of technology k by ¯rm i, and suppose
that Assumption 1 holds and x¤
i = L. Then:
(i) For the youngest ¯rm with nk
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(ii) For a su±ciently old ¯rm" i.e., nk
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k with probability »k
x
¤
i with probability 1 ¡ »k ¡ »i
´i;k;t with probability »i
(8)
where ´i;k;t is equal to L with probability 1/2 and equal to R with probability 1/2, and also i.i.d across




i; whereas informed managers know x
¤
i;k;t:
The case analyzed in the text corresponds to the one where »k = 0 and "i = »i=2.
144 Econometric Speci¯cation and Data
4.1 Empirical Strategy
In our empirical work, we will document a number of correlations motivated by the theory pre-
sented in the previous section. Recall that the main predictions of our approach, as summarized
in Propositions 1-3, are:
1. Delegation should be more common for ¯rms closer to the technological frontier.
2. Delegation should be more prevalent in environments with greater heterogeneity.
3. Young ¯rms should be more likely to choose delegation.
We investigate these predictions by studying the correlation between various explanatory
factors and decentralization decisions of several thousand French and British ¯rms. Consider
the following equation:
d¤
ilt = ®Hilt¡1 + ¯PFilt¡1 + °PMCilt¡1 + ±ageilt¡1 + w0
ilt¡1³ + uilt; (9)
where i denotes ¯rm, l denotes industry and t denotes time. d¤
ilt is a latent variable indicating
the propensity to delegate authority to managers. Hilt¡1 is a measure of heterogeneity (or in
some experiments inverse heterogeneity, or\homogeneity"), PFilt¡1 is a measure of\proximity
to the frontier" (inverse measure of \distance to the frontier"), ageilt¡1 denotes the age of
the ¯rm, wilt¡1 is a vector of other controls, and PMCilt¡1 is a measure of product market
competition, which we ¯nd to be a robust predictor of delegation and thus include it as part
of our main speci¯cation (we return to an interpretation of this term below in subsection 5.9).
All right-hand side variables refer to t ¡ 1, while the dependent variable is for t, which is
an attempt to prevent the most obvious form of reverse causality. Nevertheless, we do not
view estimates from equation (9) as corresponding to causal e®ects, since there may be other
omitted factors, simultaneously a®ecting both the (lagged) right-hand side variables and the
delegation decisions. Below, we deal with part of this endogeneity issue by using values from
the UK manufacturing sector to instrument for H and PF. For now, all omitted factors are
captured by the error term uilt, which we assume to be normally distributed.
In all of our speci¯cations, we observe an indicator of decentralization, dilt 2 f0;1g, and in









ilt is given by (9). Equation (10) leads to the standard probit model (see Wooldridge,
2002, Chapter 15). We therefore estimate (9) by maximum likelihood probit. We check the
robustness of our results by using logit and linear probability speci¯cations. In all cases, the
standard errors are robust and allow for arbitrary variance-covariance structure at the four-
digit industry level (White, 1980).
4.2 Data and Measurement
We use two datasets of French ¯rms and one of British ¯rms. The use of multiple datasets
is an important cross-validation of the robustness of our results. Our ¯rst and main dataset,
\Changements Organisationnels et Informatisation" (COI),13 covers just over 4,000 manufac-
turing ¯rms. Using unique ¯rm identi¯ers, ¯rms in this dataset are matched to the dataset
FUTE (see Appendix B), which contains the entire population of French ¯rms with more than
20 employees.14 Many of our right-hand side variables are constructed from the FUTE and
thus refer to this entire population. Since the COI contains some ¯rms with less than 20
employees, the match leaves us with a total of 3,570 ¯rms for our basic analysis.
Using the COI, we build a measure of decentralization based on the organization of a ¯rm's
business units into pro¯t centers (see Appendix B for a more detailed description). In practice,
once a ¯rm grows beyond a certain size it faces the choice of retaining centralized control
or allowing some decentralization. Firms are generally organized into business units, with
di®erent degrees of responsibility delegated to the managers of these units. While some ¯rms
retain complete command and control at the center, most create some form of \responsibility
centers" for business unit managers.15 These responsibility centers (from the most to the
least decentralized) are pro¯t centers, cost centers and revenue centers. Our key indicator for
decentralization is whether the ¯rm is organized primarily into pro¯t centers. As the name
suggests, when a ¯rm organizes into pro¯t centers, a manager is responsible for the pro¯ts of the
unit that she manages. She is given considerable autonomy to make decisions on the purchase
of assets, hiring of personnel, the management of inventories and determination of bonuses and
13For previous uses of this dataset see, Aubert, Caroli and Roger (2004), Janod (2002), Janod and Saint-Martin
(2004), Cr¶ epon, Heckel and Riedinger (2004), and Greenan and Mairesse (1999).
14FUTE also contains population of non-manufacturing ¯rms with more than ten employees. These data are
not published in the French National Accounts, so we worked directly with the underlying micro data located
in the French statistical agencies in order to construct the appropriate variables. Similarly the information on
the demographic structure of each ¯rm (skills, worker age, hours, gender, etc.) had to be built up from the
employee level datasources aggregated to the ¯rm level (see Appendix B).
15For the meaning of the terms responsibility centers and pro¯t centers in the business literature
and in management, see, for example: http://smccd.net/accounts/nurre/online/chtr12a.htm. In addition,
http://www.aloa.co.uk/members/downloads/PDF%20Output/costcentres.pdf, provides a standard discussion
of autonomy of pro¯t centers. Janod (2002) and Janod and Saint-Martin (2004) have previously used these data
on pro¯t centers as a measure of decentralization.
16promotions. She keeps track of both revenues and costs with the aim of maximizing pro¯t.16
In contrast, a cost (revenue) center manager is responsible only for costs (revenue). Milgrom
and Roberts (1992, pp. 229-230), for example, contrast cost and pro¯t centers managers as
follows: \Managers who are given responsibility for pro¯ts, for example, are commonly given
broader decision authority than those responsible just for costs or sales." Overall about 30%
of French ¯rms in our sample are organized into pro¯t centers.
Our second dataset, the \Enqu^ ete Reponse" (ER), is a survey of just under 3,000 French
establishments covering all sectors of the economy conducted in 1998. This dataset is also
matched with the FUTE to construct the right-hand side variables, which leaves us with a
dataset of around 2,200 establishments. In this data set, delegation can be measured in two
ways. First, there is a direct question asked to plant managers over the degree of autonomy
they have in investment decisions relative to Head Quarters. Since this question only makes
sense for ¯rms that are part of a larger group, the analysis is restricted to this sub-sample (of
1,258 establishments). Second, there is a question related to delayering, which indicates whether
there was any reduction in the number of hierarchical layers between 1996 and 1998. Although,
a priori, delayering may increase or reduce delegation (it may, for example, reduce delegation
by making the chief executive more informed about lower layers), existing evidence shows that
delayering is associated with delegating power down the managerial hierarchy (Rajan and Wulf,
2005, Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001). Since delayering provides information on organizational
\changes"(i.e., whether a ¯rm became more or less hierarchical) rather than\levels", we use a
variation of equation (9).
Finally, we draw on a UK dataset, the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS),
which is similar in structure to Enqu^ ete Reponse (in fact, ER was modeled on earlier waves of
WERS). WERS does not have a question on plant managers' autonomy in investment decisions,
but contains a question on their autonomy from headquarters in making employment decisions.
We use this question to denote the degree of decentralization (a binary variable equal to unity
if a manager could make recruiting decisions without having to consult headquarters). Unlike
the French data for con¯dentiality reasons, we are not allowed to legally match WERS with
productivity at the ¯rm level, though we can match in productivity information at the four-
digit industry level.17
16Merchant's (1989, p.10) textbook on pro¯t centers explains: \The pro¯t center managers frequently know
their business better than top management does because they can devote much more of their time to following
up developments in their specialized areas. Hence, top level managers usually do not have detailed knowledge
of the actions they want particular pro¯t center managers to take, and even direct monitoring of the actions
taken, if it were feasible would not ensure pro¯t center managers were acting appropriately."
17Full details from COI, ER and WERS are in the Appendix B and Appendix Tables B1 and B2 contain
17For Hil we use two measures; H+
l and H¡
i . Both of these measures are constructed from
the FUTE dataset (in the UK we can construct H+
l using the ABI Census data). The main
measure we use of heterogeneity, H+
l , is the dispersion of ¯rm productivity growth within a
four-digit sector. In terms of the model in Section 3, high values of H+
l therefore correspond
to high values of ". This variable is constructed using the entire FUTE dataset (regardless of
whether a ¯rm was surveyed by in COI or ER). We measure productivity growth by the average
annual growth in value added per hour over the 1994 to 1997 period.18 Our main measure of
dispersion is the the di®erence in productivity growth rates between the 90th percentile and
the 10th percentile in the four-digit industry
H+
l = (¢lnyil)90 ¡ (¢lnyil)10 (11)
where (¢lnyil)P is the Pth percentile of the distribution of productivity growth across all ¯rms
in industry l. Productivity growth is de¯ned as the three-year average change in (the log of)
value added per hour. We also consider several alternatives such as the di®erence between the
95th and the 5th percentiles (instead of the 90-10), the standard deviation of ¯rm productivity
growth rates and the standard deviation of the trimmed productivity growth distribution.
Since the measure of H+
l is the same across all ¯rms in a four-digit industry, we also
constructed a second ¯rm-speci¯c measure. This second index, H¡
i , is an inverse measure of
heterogeneity, i.e., a measure of homogeneity, hence the\¡"superscript. In terms of the model
in Section 3, high values of H¡
i therefore correspond to low values of ". This measure attempts
to quantify how many other ¯rms are close \neighbors" in the product space. When there
are more similar ¯rms (neighbors), the ¯rm will have greater opportunity to learn from the
experiences of other ¯rms. This measure of closeness is inspired by Ja®e's (1986) approach,
but uses the proportion of production in a four-digit industry.19
First, for each ¯rm i we compute the distribution of production across 400 four-digit sectors.
Let the set of ¯rms in this dataset be denoted by N, and denote the set of ¯rms in COI by C.
Let Sil denote the production of ¯rm i 2 N in industry l for all industries l 2 L ´ f1;::;Lg,
and de¯ne Si = (Si1;:::;Sil;:::;SiL) as the vector of production for ¯rm i. We then de¯ne
the share of a ¯rm's total production in industry l as sil = Sil=
P
j2L Sij: The denominator
detailed descriptive statistics.
18As discussed in detail in the Appendix B, data before 1994 are not reliable. Note that we only average over
two years if the ¯rm enters the sample in 1995 and one year if it enters in 1996.
We also report TFP-based measures as a robustness check. TFP is closer to the theory, but more likley to be
a®ected by measurement error.
19Ja®e originally used patents technology class, which has the potential disadvantage that many ¯rms do not
patent, especially in service sectors.
18of sil is the total production of the ¯rm, so that sil will be unity for a ¯rm that only operates
in industry l (and zero for other industries). More generally, for ¯rms operating in multiple
industries it will lie between zero and one. The ¯rm-speci¯c vector of production shares across


































which takes greater values when the production pro¯les of two ¯rms are more similar, and is
equal to unity when the two pro¯les are identical.
Since our theoretical approach emphasizes the importance of similarity in the context of










where ITi0 is calculated as the level of investment in IT by ¯rm i0, so that (12) weights ¯rms
according to their investment in new technology. Equation (12) also emphasizes that H¡
i is
calculated from the similarity of each ¯rm in our dataset to any ¯rm in the FUTE, i.e., the
entire French population of ¯rms.
A possible shortcoming of the index H¡
i is that many new technologies may fall outside
the IT category, so we also check the robustness of our results by looking at an alternative










i02N i0 denotes the number of ¯rms in the FUTE sample. We also construct
another alternative measure, HR¡
i , which weights ¯rms di®erentially depending on their geo-
graphic proximity, and this measure is described in greater detail in Appendix B.
An important concern with these homogeneity measures is that they may be related to the
level of product market competition. If there are many other ¯rms\close"to a company in the
product market space, then this company may be facing tougher competition.20 To alleviate
20See Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2004) for a discussion.
19this concern, we control for a number of measures of the extent of product market competition
in our main speci¯cations. Nonetheless, it is important to note that to the extent that our
homogeneity measure is correlated with product market competition (beyond our controls),
this will likely bias the results towards ¯nding a positive e®ect of our homogeneity variables
(i.e., the opposite of the prediction in Section 3). This is because, as we document below, there
is a fairly robust positive relationship between product market competition and delegation.21
Our key indicator of proximity to the frontier is the gap between the log labor productivity
of a ¯rm (measured as value-added per hour) and the frontier (log) labor productivity in
the primary four-digit industry of the ¯rm, lnyilt ¡ lnyFlt, where F denotes the frontier,
measured in a number of alternative ways. In addition to average labor productivity, we also
report robustness checks using Total Factor Productivity (TFP).22 We also construct several
indicators of \frontier" productivity. Our main measure is the highest productivity in the
¯rm's primary four-digit industry (de¯ned as the 99th percentile to mitigate any measurement
error from outliers that might arise had we used the maximum) again calculated from the
FUTE dataset. We repeat the same exercise using other percentiles (90th and 95th), and we
consider alternative measures based on the ¯rm's productivity rank in the four-digit industry|
an ordinal measure which relies less on our cardinal measurement of productivity.
As a robustness check on our main speci¯cation, we also allow lnyilt¡1 and lnyFlt¡1 to
have di®erent coe±cients in the regression equation, by estimating
d¤
ilt = ®Hilt¡1 + ¯1 lnyilt¡1 + ¯2 lnyFlt¡1 + °PMCilt¡1 + ±ageilt¡1 + w0
ilt¡1³ + uilt: (14)
This speci¯cation allows us to test whether ¯2 < 0 (i.e., whether as predicted by our theory,
delegation is negatively correlated with lagged frontier productivity) and also whether ¯1 =
¡¯2. This robustness check is particularly important, since a positive correlation between
distance to frontier and decentralization may re°ect a positive e®ect of decentralization on
productivity. Equation (14) enables us to check for this directly by seeing whether ¯2 = 0.
In addition, since our motivating theory relates to the implementation of new technologies,
we also estimate (9) and (14) separately in high-tech and low-tech ¯rms. We expect the
patterns suggested by our model to be more pronounced for high-tech ¯rms.
To measure age, ageilt¡1, we use four dummies for age ranges less than 5 years, between
5 and 10 years, between 10 and 20 years, and the reference category, greater than 20 years.23
21This is also consistent with the results in Nickell, Nicolitsas and Patterson (2001) and McKinsey Global
Institute (2002).
22In speci¯cations that also include ¯rm-level and industry-level capital intensity variables, the labor produc-
tivity terms also approximate TFP.
23Since our main models are cross-sectional, we cannot distinguish age and cohort e®ects. Nevertheless, the
20Finally, our main measure of product market competition is the Lerner index, calculated as
pro¯ts (value added minus labor costs) divided by sales from the FUTE dataset.
As an attempt to control for the potential endogeneity of heterogeneity/homogeneity and
proximity to frontier measures, and also to examine the direction of potential biases, we also
experiment with an instrumental-variable strategy treating these terms as endogenous, and
using values of the same variables in the corresponding four-digit UK industry as instruments
(see Hausman and Taylor, 1981). The idea is that, as discussed above, ¯rm-speci¯c or French
industry-speci¯c shocks to d¤
ilt could feedback to the heterogeneity or distance to frontier terms,
biasing the coe±cient estimates.24 The UK values of heterogeneity should be correlated with
the French values insofar as they represent\fundamentals"about the industry, but should not
be a®ected by shocks speci¯c to French ¯rms. Similarly, fundamental technological changes
should simultaneously raise the UK and French frontier (for example, because the US makes a
breakthrough that bene¯ts frontier ¯rms in UK and France). It is important to note, however,
that this instrumental variables strategy will not necessarily estimate causal e®ect either, since
there may still exist omitted factors that are common to both French and UK industries that
a®ect both the right-hand side variables and delegation.
5 Results
5.1 Decentralization
Table 1 presents the basic ¯ndings using the decentralization measure from COI. In this table,
all regressions are estimated by maximum likelihood (ML) probit following equations (9) and
(10) above. We report marginal e®ects evaluated at the sample means. As in all other tables,
standard errors are computed using the Huber formula allowing for heteroskedasticity and
an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix at the four-digit industry level. Moreover, all of our
regressions include a full set of three-digit industry dummies.25
The ¯rst column is the most parsimonious speci¯cation to look at the e®ect of the hetero-
geneity measure, H+
l . The regression only includes this variable and a full set of three-digit
industry dummies. Consistent with the predictions in Section 3, there is a positive correlation
between heterogeneity and decentralization, so that ¯rms in more heterogeneous environments
results in Table 6 below suggest that the patterns we document are not purely due to cohort e®ects.
24The fact that we are using lagged values on the right-hand side ameliorates but does not solve this problem
because of potential serial correlation in these variables.
25The frontier productivity term and the heterogeneity measure H
+
l are de¯ned at the four-digit level, so
we can only include three-digit industry dummies if we want to identify their coe±cients. We present some
speci¯cations including four-digit dummies to show the robustness of the marginal e®ects of the other variables.
21are more likely to be decentralized. The marginal e®ect of heterogeneity is -0.212 and is
signi¯cant at the 5% level.
The second column estimates an equation similar to (14) in order to look at the e®ect of
the frontier productivity term (measured as the 99th percentile of the productivity distrib-
ution in the primary four-digit industry of the ¯rm) and the ¯rm's own productivity. This
speci¯cation still includes a full set of three-digit industry dummies. Both productivity terms
are signi¯cant, and consistent with the predictions above, there is a negative coe±cient on the
frontier productivity term (i.e., ¯2 < 0) and a positive coe±cient on the own productivity term
(i.e., ¯1 > 0). The Wald test at the bottom of the table rejects the restriction that ¯1 = ¡¯2,
though when additional covariates are included in columns (7) and (8) this restriction will no
longer be rejected. The third column imposes that the coe±cients are equal and have opposite
signs, and includes a single \proximity to frontier" variable as in equation (9). The marginal
e®ect is now estimated to be 0.159 (standard error = 0.024). Overall, these patterns suggest
that ¯rms closer to the technology frontier of their industry are more likely to be decentralized.
The fourth column looks at the e®ect of age and includes only the dummy variables for
the age of the ¯rm (this regression includes a full set of four-digit industry dummies). The
youngest ¯rms (under 5 years old) are 13% more likely to be decentralized than the oldest
¯rms (those over 20 years old) and this di®erence is signi¯cant at the 5% level.
The remaining columns include all these variables simultaneously and look at the e®ect
of including additional covariates. Without the additional covariates, in columns (5) and (6),
heterogeneity, age, and the proximity terms remain jointly and individually signi¯cant. The
magnitudes are also quite similar to those in columns (1)-(4).
The ¯nal two columns include a large number of additional controls to check whether
the partial correlations are due to some other omitted variables. These additional covariates
include the following variables: the Lerner Index, a foreign ownership dummy, the log number
of plants of the ¯rm, the (log of) capital stock divided by value added, log ¯rm size, the fraction
of employees working with computers,26 the fraction of high skilled workers, the average age
of workers, the ¯rm's market share, a diversi¯cation index (see Appendix B), as well as a
number of industry-level variables, in particular, (in logs) capital stock divided by employment,
IT expenditures divided by employment and the Her¯ndahl index. The capital stock and
computer use variables are included both as potential controls and also to bring the measure
of labor productivity closer to TFP by controlling for the contribution of various components
26We also experimented with the ¯rm-level IT investment intensity, but this variable was never signi¯cant
given the industry-level IT measure and the fraction of employees using computers (which is consistent with the
results in Askenazy et al, 2005).
22of the capital stock. Firm-level worker characteristics are included since these may a®ect
organizational choices; for example, ¯rms with more skilled workers and/or younger workers
might be more likely to decentralize control. Finally, centralized management may be more
di±cult for more diversi¯ed and larger ¯rms (Colombo and Delmastro, 2004). The full results
from these regressions are presented in Table C1 in Appendix C. Columns (7) and (8) in Table
1 report the estimates for our main variables of interest. The additional controls improve
the ¯t of the model. Nevertheless, the heterogeneity, age and productivity terms all remain
individually signi¯cant at the 5% level or less. Also interestingly, in this speci¯cation we can
no longer reject the hypothesis that ¯1 = ¡¯2, i.e., the hypothesis that frontier and own labor
productivity terms have equal and opposite-signed coe±cients.
The full results in Appendix Table C1 show that consistent with the results in the previous
literature, ¯rms that are more skill-intensive (Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001), that employ
younger workers (Aubert et al, 2004) and/or that are more in more IT-intensive industries
(Bresnahan et al, 2002) appear signi¯cantly more likely to be decentralized. Furthermore,
¯rms that are large, multi-plant, foreign owned and/or more diversi¯ed are also more likely
to decentralize. Firm-level capital stock or industry-level capital stock do not appear to have
a major e®ect on decentralization. The Lerner index (a proxy for the price cost margin) is
strongly negatively associated with the probability of decentralizing. We show that this a very
robust empirical result suggesting that ¯rms with market power are less likely to delegate. In
subsection 5.9, we discuss a potential explanation for the relationship between competition and
decentralization based on our model in Section 3.
Overall, the results in Table 1 suggest that, consistent with our model and the relationships
shown in Figures 1-3, ¯rms that operate in more heterogeneous environments, that are closer to
the technology frontier, and that are younger are signi¯cantly more likely to be decentralized.
5.2 Magnitudes
It is also useful to look at the magnitudes of the e®ects estimated in Table 1. To gauge the
quantitative magnitudes of these estimates, we look at the impact of doubling each variable
starting from its sample mean.
Using the estimate in Table 1 column (8), 0.251, we ¯nd that doubling the mean value of
heterogeneity (the inter-decile range of ¯rm productivity growth in the industry) from 0.275
to 0.550 increases the predicted probability of a ¯rm being decentralized into pro¯t centers by
approximately 7 percentage points (0:251 £ 0:275 ¼ 0:069) starting from a base of 30 percent,
which is a sizeable e®ect. Thus, in\elasticity"terms, a doubling of heterogeneity is associated
23with a 23% increase in the probability of decentralization (a 6.9 percentage point increase
on a base of 30 percent).27 Again using the estimate from column (8) of Table 1, doubling
the proximity measure leads to a substantial increase in the probability of decentralization of
about 11 percentage points which represents a 37% increase on the base of about 30 percent
(0:164 £ ln2=0:3). Also using the estimates from column (8) of Table 1, increasing the age
of a ¯rm from four years to eight years reduces the probability of decentralization by a third
(11 percentage points on a 30 percent base), while doubling the Lerner index at the mean
(0.075) reduces decentralization probabilities by about 5.5 percentage points (18% on the 30
percent base). These calculations suggest that the statistical associations documented in Table
1 appear to be economically as well as statistically signi¯cant.
5.3 Alternative Measures of Heterogeneity
Table 2 contrasts our basic measure of heterogeneity (the decile ratio of ¯rm productivity
growth rates in the industry) with several alternative indicators of heterogeneity. The ¯rst
column of Table 2 replicates the speci¯cation from the last column of Table 1 for comparison.
The next three columns (2)-(4) use alternative measures of heterogeneity, H+
l still based on
the dispersion of productivity growth rates across ¯rms within the four-digit industry. Column
(2) shows a similar result to column (1) using the di®erence between the productivity growth
rates at the 95th and 5th percentiles (instead of the 90th and 10th percentiles). The marginal
e®ect is 0.142 with a standard error of 0.069. In column (3) we use the standard deviation of
the growth rate, which also has a positive marginal e®ect, but is only signi¯cant at the 10%
level. This lack of precision is due to a number of outliers in the ¯rm-level productivity growth
distribution. When we calculate the standard deviation after trimming the top and bottom
5% of the ¯rm-level productivity growth distribution, we obtain a much larger and much more
signi¯cant marginal e®ect in column (4). Overall, the results in this table show that there is a
robust positive association between heterogeneity and decentralization.28
As an alternative to H+
l we use an index of homogeneity, H¡
i .29 Recall that this index
measures is the IT-weighted distance of a ¯rm to all other ¯rms, where \distance" is de¯ned
27A one standard deviation increase in heterogeneity (0.148) results in a smaller increase in the likelihood of
decentralization: a 3.7 percentage point, or 12% increase.
28One concern with any measure of heterogeneity is that, since it is correlated with uncertainty in ¯rm's
environment, it may a®ect the extent of the moral hazard problem between the ¯rm and the manager (an issue
we have abstracted from in the model). Nevertheless, everything else equal, this e®ect would bias the results
against ¯nding a positive association between heterogeneity and decentralization, since greater uncertainty in
the environment will increase agency costs and make centralization more attractive.
29All of the results in Table 1 are similar if we use these homogeneity index, H
¡
i ; instead of the heterogeneity
index H
+
l . For example, the most parsimonious speci¯cation in column (1) of Table 1 gives a marginal e®ect of
H
¡
i of 0.112 with a standard error of 0.034 (further results available upon request, and see also Appendix C1).
24over the sectors in which the ¯rm is active. This is an entirely di®erent source of variation
in heterogeneity, so constitutes a useful cross-validation for whether the relationship between
the heterogeneity index and decentralization in Table 1 is indeed related to the e®ect of het-
erogeneity of the environment facing the ¯rm on decentralization decisions. In column (5)
of Table 2, the homogeneity index takes its expected negative sign with a marginal e®ect of
-0.063 and a standard error of 0.031. In column (6) we look at the simpler unweighted measure
of homogeneity (HA¡
i ). This is also useful as another check to see whether our homogeneity
measure is capturing some competition-related factors. If this were the case, we would expect
the unweighted measure to be stronger. The unweighted measure also has a negative e®ect,
but with a smaller coe±cient that is not statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level. This suggests
that the IT weights increase the explanatory power of the homogeneity index.30
We also experimented with a third alternative homogeneity index, which exploits the ge-
ographical proximity of ¯rms, HR¡
i . This index captures the idea that it may be easier to
learn from ¯rms that are physically close as suggested by the economic geography literature
(e.g., Keller, 2002). Essentially, HR¡
i gives a greater weight to ¯rms that are geographically
(as well as technologically) close to each other (See Appendix B for the exact de¯nition of this
variable). In the ¯nal column we see that the marginal e®ect of homogeneity rises to -0.069
with a standard error of 0.034, slightly stronger than the simpler version of homogeneity, H¡
i ;
in column (4).
5.4 Di®erences Between High-Tech and Low-Tech Sectors
Since the theory in Section 3 relates the propensity to decentralize to the adoption of new
technologies, we may expect a stronger relationship between decentralization and heterogene-
ity/homogeneity in the high-tech industries than in the low-tech sectors. This is investigated
in Table 3. We de¯ne \high-tech" sectors to be those with an average ratio of IT investment
per worker greater than the sample median.
The ¯rst three columns use the baseline heterogeneity index, H+
l , measured as the 90-10
dispersion of productivity growth while the last three columns use the homogeneity index, H¡
i .
The ¯rst column of Table 3 repeats column (8) of Table 1 for comparison purposes. The
second column presents the results for the high-tech sectors and the third column presents
results for the low-tech sectors. Consistent with our expectations, the marginal e®ects and
signi¯cance of the distance to frontier and heterogeneity variables are stronger in the high-
30If we include both the weighted and the unweighted measures together with all covariates, the weighted
measure is negative and signi¯cant at the 5% level (coe±cient = -0.184, standard error = 0.096), while the
unweighted measure is positive (coe±cient = 0.142, standard error = 0.109).
25tech sectors than in the low-tech sectors (the pattern is similar but less clear for age). For
example, column (3) shows that the heterogeneity index, H+
l ; is positive and signi¯cant in the
high-tech sectors, but negative and insigni¯cant in the low-tech sector. The marginal e®ects
of proximity to frontier and the youngest age bin are twice as large in the high-tech sectors as
the low-tech sectors. The Wald tests at the bottom of the table show that these di®erences
are signi¯cant at the 1% level for heterogeneity, the 5% level for proximity to frontier but
insigni¯cantly di®erent for age. The next three columns repeat the same regressions using the
homogeneity index, H¡
i . The pattern of di®erences between high-tech and low-tech sectors is
similar to those for heterogeneity. For example, the marginal e®ects of proximity and youngest
¯rm are twice as large in the high-tech sectors as the low-tech sectors. The marginal e®ect of
homogeneity is almost ¯ve times as large in absolute magnitude in the high-tech sector. With
the homogeneity measure, however, the marginal e®ects in the two subsamples are statistically
di®erent only at the 10% level.
These results are encouraging since they suggest that, consistent with our theory in Section
3, the relationship between heterogeneity or proximity to frontier and decentralization appears
to be more pronounced in high-tech sectors.
5.5 Further Robustness Checks
Table 4 reports the results of a further series of robustness checks. It is designed to show
that the results do not depend on the precise functional form, control variables or sample used
in the main regressions. Each column corresponds to a separate regression and reports the
marginal e®ects and standard errors of the key variables (heterogeneity, frontier productivity,
own productivity, age and competition).
The ¯rst column replicates the baseline results from column (7) of Table 1 for comparison.
Column (2) reports the marginal e®ects from a logit model instead of a probit; these results are
very similar to the probit estimates. Column (3) reports estimates from a linear probability
model. The results are again very similar to the baseline of the probit model.
Column (4) uses TFP instead of labor productivity as the measure of the proximity to
frontier.31 TFP is more closely related to the theoretical idea of productivity we wish to
capture, though it is also likely to be subject to greater measurement error. Both frontier and
own TFP remain statistically signi¯cant with the expected signs; the estimate is smaller in
absolute magnitude on frontier TFP and larger in absolute magnitude on the ¯rm's own TFP.
31TFP is constructed using the four-digit industry speci¯c wage bill shares to weight the factor inputs and
assumes constant returns (see Appendix B for details).
26In column (5), we construct the rank of the ¯rm's labor productivity in the four-digit
industry. This measure relies less on the exact distance in productivity space between two
¯rms, and only exploits the ordinal ranking of ¯rms. We ¯nd the same pattern of results:
companies further down the productivity ranking are signi¯cantly less likely to decentralize.
In columns (6) and (7), we use the 95th and 90th percentiles of the productivity distrib-
ution to represent the frontier instead of the 99th percentile as in our baseline speci¯cations.
Although the coe±cient on frontier productivity remains negative, it becomes smaller and less
precise as we move down the percentiles of productivity. This is not entirely surprising, since
the 99th should be a better measure of the \frontier" than the 95th or the 90th percentiles.
Column (8) weights the regression by ¯rm size as the variables may be measured with
greater error for smaller ¯rms. We obtain somewhat more signi¯cant results in this weighted
regression, but the standard error is similar to that in the baseline speci¯cation.
Although a single ¯rm can be organized into divisions with each division decentralized as a
pro¯t center, the measure of pro¯t centers may be more natural for ¯rms that are part of larger
groups. To investigate this issue further, in column (9) we re-estimated the equation on the
sub-sample of 1,793 \under control" ¯rms, which are those that are part of a larger corporate
group.32 The marginal e®ects of heterogeneity and frontier are considerably larger and more
signi¯cant for this subsample, suggesting that the baseline results, if anything, underestimate
the importance of heterogeneity and proximity to frontier. An alternative to this sub-sample
is to consider only joint stock ¯rms (dropping the smaller limited liability ¯rms). We do this
in column (10) and again ¯nd that the results are robust.
Another concern is that we have allocated a single \frontier" to each ¯rm, whereas ¯rms
that operate across multiple industries will have multiple \frontiers". To address this concern,
we limit the sample to ¯rms that have at least 80% of their sales in their primary four-digit
industry, since the multiple industry issue should not be a serious concern for these ¯rms.
This restriction reduces our sample to 2,555 ¯rms. Column (11) shows that the frontier term
remains negative and signi¯cant in this smaller sample, though its marginal e®ect is also
somewhat smaller -0.179 as compared to -0.225 in the baseline speci¯cation.
Recall that the speci¯cation in column (7) of Table 1 includes a dummy for foreign owner-
ship. Column (12) goes one step further and drops all the foreign-owned ¯rms from the sample.
The results remain robust.
We also performed a number of additional robustness checks, including the same set of
32An additional reason for focusing on the \under control" sub-sample is that this sample likely excludes
owner-managed ¯rms.
27regressions in Table 4 using the homogeneity measure. Overall both the robustness checks re-
ported here and others indicate that there are robust associations between distance to frontier,
heterogeneity and age, on the one hand, and decentralization.
5.6 Endogeneity
In Table 5 we make an attempt to address the issue of endogeneity of our main right-hand
side variables. As discussed above, our strategy is to instrument for these variables using their
UK counterparts.33 We use industry-level variables constructed from British establishment
micro-data (the ABI) and matched to our French four-digit industries for identical time pe-
riods. More speci¯cally, we constructed heterogeneity variables identical to H+
l based on the
dispersion of productivity growth between British ¯rms to instrument French heterogeneity.
We also constructed the 99th percentile of the productivity distribution in each British four-
digit industry as an instrument for the French proximity to frontier. Appendix B contains
more details on the construction of these variables.
Our ¯rst strategy uses an instrumental variable probit model (Lee, 1981), but we also
compare these results with alternative\two-step"methods (Rivers and Vuong, 1988) and two-
stage least squares estimates of the linear probability model.
The ¯rst column of Table 5 repeats the baseline speci¯cation for the sub-sample where we
have French and UK data (which is slightly smaller - 3,518 ¯rms - than our baseline sample
of 3,570 ¯rms). The results are practically identical to those in the larger sample. The second
column shows the ¯rst-stage for the French heterogeneity variable in a speci¯cation where only
the heterogeneity term is treated as endogenous. UK heterogeneity is positively and signi¯-
cantly associated with French heterogeneity in the same industry, even after conditioning on
all the other exogenous variables (the t-statistic of the excluded instrument is over 3 and the
partial R2 is 0.091, so weak instruments are unlikely to be an issue). The third column shows
results from IV probit; all of our key variables are again correctly signed and signi¯cant at
the 5% level. Interestingly, the marginal e®ect of heterogeneity is now much larger, 1.185 as
compared to 0.230 in the baseline speci¯cation. This suggests that the probit estimates in
Tables 1-4 may have been biased downwards due to attenuation, which may be corrected by
the instrumentation strategy.34 The presence of downward attenuation bias is not entirely sur-
prising since the heterogeneity index (and the proximity to frontier measure below) correspond
33We chose the UK over the US, since the UK is both geographically closer to France and likely to be more
coordinated with the French economy because of the European Union.
34If, instead of the IV probit model, we estimate the linear probability model using two stage least squares,
the estimated marginal e®ect is very similar: 1.105 with a standard error of 0.526.
28only approximately to the theoretical concepts we would like to measure in the data.
Column (4) shows the ¯rst stage for proximity to frontier, which is now the only variable
treated as endogenous and instrumented with the UK frontier variable. The UK frontier vari-
able has the expected negative sign (recall that French frontier productivity is the denominator
of the level of the proximity to frontier term that is being instrumented). The ¯rst-stage rela-
tionship is again quite strong and the t-statistic on the excluded instrument is now over 4. The
¯fth column shows the IV probit results treating the proximity to the frontier as endogenous.
The estimate of the marginal e®ect of proximity to the frontier in this IV speci¯cation is also
larger than the baseline probit estimate reported in column (1); 0.341 versus 0.167. The other
variables retain the same signs as in column (1).35 This speci¯cation, therefore, also suggests
that the main e®ect of endogeneity might be a downward bias due to attenuation.36
In the last columns of Table 5, we simultaneously treat heterogeneity and proximity to
frontier as endogenous. Columns (6) and (7) show the two ¯rst stages. Encouragingly, the
UK heterogeneity measure predicts French heterogeneity and not the French proximity to
frontier, while UK frontier productivity predicts French proximity to frontier and not the
French heterogeneity term. The decentralization equation is given in the ¯nal column. The
heterogeneity and proximity to frontier terms are both individually signi¯cant at the 5% level
in this IV probit regression and as in the previous columns, the marginal e®ects are larger than
in the probit regressions that treat them as exogenous.37 The IV results of Table 5, therefore,
suggest that treating heterogeneity and proximity as exogenous likely makes us underestimate
their importance for decentralization.
Overall, the results in Table 1-5 suggest that, consistent with the broad implications of our
model, ¯rms that operate in more homogeneous environments, that are further from the tech-
nology frontier, and that are older are signi¯cantly more likely to be centralized. Furthermore,
these e®ects appear to be stronger for ¯rms in the high-tech industries.
35Two stage least squares estimate of the e®ect of proximity to frontier in the linear probability model is 0.293
(standard error = 0.118).
36If we split the proximity to frontier into its two components (as in Table 1 column (7)) and use the UK
frontier to instrument only the French frontier, the marginal e®ect of the frontier increases from -0.244 in the
probit speci¯cation to -0.967 in the IV probit speci¯cation.
37Using two stage least squares in the linear probability model again generates very similar results. The e®ect
of heterogeneity is estimated to be 1.452 with a standard error of 0.663 (compared with a coe±cient of 0.204
with a standard error of 0.111 in the OLS). The coe±cient on proximity to frontier is estimated to be 0.410
with a standard error of 0.189 (compared with 0.147 with a standard error of 0.026 in the OLS regressions).
295.7 Alternative Measures of Decentralization
We next consider two alternative measures of decentralization; control over investment decisions
and delayering. Whether an establishment's senior managers can make investment decisions
without consulting headquarters is clearly directly related to delegation of authority. Case
study and econometric evidence suggests that reducing the layers of the managerial hierarchy
tends to be associated with decentralized decision making.38 In the COI dataset there is an
indicator of the number of hierarchical levels, but as discussed in the Appendix B, a better
datasource to measure delayering is the Enqu^ ete Reponse (ER).39 The question of autonomy
over investment decisions is only available in the Enqu^ ete Reponse.
Table 6 shows the results of estimating equation (14) for these alternative measures.
Throughout, we show results separately for the full sample and also for the high-tech and
the low-tech sub-samples (created using industry IT intensity as in Table 3). We limit the
sample to ¯rms that are\under control"(i.e., part of a larger group as de¯ned above) because
the question on delegation of investment decisions from headquarters is only relevant for these
¯rms. In columns (1) through (3) the dependent variable is the binary indicator of whether
the ¯rm allows autonomy to its plant managers in making investment decisions. In columns
(4) through (9), the dependent variable is de¯ned as an indicator for whether there was a
reduction in the number of layers in the managerial hierarchy between 1996 and 1998.
In column (1) of Table 6 frontier productivity is negatively and signi¯cantly related to the
probability of allowing managers to make investment decisions without consulting headquar-
ters (decentralization). Heterogeneity is positively related to decentralization but (like age) is
insigni¯cant. When we split the sample into high-tech and low-tech sectors, the results are
stronger. In the high-tech sectors heterogeneity is positively related to the probability of delay-
ering at the 5% signi¯cance level, whereas in the low-tech sectors heterogeneity is insigni¯cant.
Similarly, the frontier productivity term is negatively and signi¯cantly related to decentraliza-
tion in the high-tech sectors, but is insigni¯cant in the low-tech sectors. Own productivity and
age are insigni¯cant in both subsamples.
The next six columns use the measure of delayering as the dependent variable. In column
(4) the productivity terms are both correctly signed and signi¯cant at the 5% level, suggesting
that the more proximate the ¯rm is to the frontier the more likely it is to delayer. Younger
38See, for example, Rajan and Wulf (2005) or Caroli and Van Reenen (2001).
39Brie°y, this is because the Enqu^ ete Reponse question on delayering refers explicitly to changes in manage-
ment, which is the concern of the theory. The COI question, by contrast, refers to the number of \hierarchical
levels"that likely includes the levels of hierarchy including those for production workers as well as those for the
management.
30¯rms are signi¯cantly more likely to delayer than older ¯rms.40 The heterogeneity term is
positive and signi¯cant at the 10% level. When the samples are split into high-tech (column
(5)) and low-tech (column (6)) sectors, the marginal e®ects of heterogeneity and proximity are
larger in the high-tech sectors than in the low-tech sectors, but the standard errors are also
much larger in both samples. In contrast, the age e®ects are larger in the low-tech sample,
which is the opposite of the prediction of our theory.
Since the delayering variable measures \organizational change" (rather than the \level" of
the centralization as our previous dependent variable), we also consider regressions where the
productivity terms are in di®erences rather than in levels. Since we do not have reliable time-
series information on the heterogeneity term and some of the other covariates, they are still
included as lagged levels. The results are presented in columns (7) through (9). The results are
similar to those before, but somewhat weaker. The frontier growth term is correctly signed, but
no longer signi¯cant and the own productivity terms is also insigni¯cant.41 The heterogeneity
measure remains positive and signi¯cant in the full sample. With the sample split, it is no
longer signi¯cant in either sample (presumably because of the smaller number of observations),
though, as expected, the marginal e®ect is substantially larger in the high-tech sample than in
the low-tech sample.
In summary, the results from using delayering and autonomy on investment decisions as
alternative indicators of decentralization broadly support our earlier conclusions. Decentral-
ization is more likely when the environment is more heterogeneous and ¯rms are closer to the
technology frontier, particularly in high-tech sectors, though the age results appear less robust.
5.8 Decentralization in Britain
We complement our evidence from the French micro datasets with an analysis of the British
Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98). The French Enqu^ ete Reponse was modeled
on WERS and we use the 1998 wave to match the year used in ER. The WERS cross-section
does not have a question on autonomy over investment decisions, but there is a similar question
on the establishment manager's autonomy on employment decisions. Senior managers were
40Although the ER data is that the establishment level, the regressions in Table 6 use ¯rm age to make the
results comparable to those in Tables 1-5. The young ¯rm dummy remains positive and signi¯cant if we also
condition on establishment age.
41The weakness of the frontier growth term is related to the higher correlation between the productivity
growth terms and our heterogeneity variable (recall that heterogeneity is de¯ned here as the decile ratio of
productivity growth rates in the ¯rm's four-digit industry). In column (7) if we drop the heterogeneity and
¯rm productivity terms, the marginal e®ect of frontier productivity growth increases to -0.064 with a standard
error of 0.031. If we use the full speci¯cation of column (7), but just include two-digit (instead of the usual
three-digit) industry dummies, the marginal e®ect of frontier growth becomes -0.074 with a standard error of
0.038.
31asked whether they were able to take decisions on sta® recruiting without consulting company
headquarters. Our WERS sample is further restricted because we are only able to match
manufacturing establishments to industry-level information (unfortunately Census information
on non-manufacturing is not available over the necessary time period).42 Finally, we are unable
to condition on the rich-set of ¯rm level covariates as in the French data, because con¯dentiality
restrictions limit the data that can matched in at the ¯rm level (such as ¯rm-level output,
capital or age).
The results are presented in Table 7. Column (1) includes the ¯rst measure of heterogeneity
(the ratio of the 95th percentile to the 5th percentile of the productivity growth rates in the
four-digit industry) with only a full set of three-digit industry dummies. Heterogeneity is
positively and signi¯cantly associated with decentralization at the 5% level. The next column
performs the same exercise for the 90-10, the relationship is still positive and signi¯cant at the
10% level. Column (3) includes the frontier growth term which is negatively signed as we would
expect from the theory, but insigni¯cant. The fourth column includes the establishment age
dummies. These are insigni¯cant and show no clear pattern (possibly because in this dataset
we only have establishment age rather than ¯rm age).
The ¯fth and sixth columns include all the covariates. There appears to be some evidence
that ¯rms facing less competition are signi¯cantly less likely to decentralize. More importantly,
the heterogeneity terms remain positively and signi¯cantly associated with the probability of
decentralization using either the 90-10 (column (5)) or the 95-5 (column (6)). The frontier
term enters negatively in the regressions in both columns and is signi¯cant at the 5% level.
Both of these ¯ndings are consistent with the theory and the results we presented from the
French datasets, even though they are taken from a di®erent dataset from a di®erent country.
5.9 Interpreting the Competition E®ects
In addition to the main predictions of our theory in Section 3, the empirical results presented so
far also show a robust and negative association of competition and decentralization. Although
competition was not a variable we originally considered in our model, these results made us
reconsider whether there are natural reasons for competition to a®ect decentralization.
One of the e®ects of competition would be similar to the heterogeneity/homogeneity vari-
ables. Firms with more competitors would learn from the experience of their competitors.
However, this e®ect is the opposite of that found in Tables 1-7, which indicate that ¯rms in
more competitive environments are more, not less, decentralized.
42Because of the smaller sample size in the UK, the sample split into high-tech versus low-tech industries and
the IV speci¯cations yield highly imprecise estimates.
32A more interesting extension is to allow the value of information to vary across ¯rms and
sectors. In particular, greater competition may increase the return to the correct implemen-
tation of new technologies, so that ¯rms avoid falling behind their competitors. If so, greater
competition will induce the principal to delegate authority to the manager with superior infor-
mation. Yet another e®ect of a more competitive environment may be through disciplining the
manager; faced with greater competition, managers may be forced to take pro¯t-maximizing
decisions more often, thus reducing the con°ict of interest between the principal and the man-
ager. This would naturally increase delegation, since delegation becomes more attractive to
the principal. We do not present these generalizations here because of space constraints.
6 Conclusions
Despite considerable academic and popular interest in the changes in the internal organization
of the ¯rm, we are far from a theoretical or an empirical consensus on the determinants of the
organizational decisions of ¯rms and on the reasons why there has recently been a signi¯cant
move towards greater decentralization. In this paper we presented a simple model of the
relationship between technology, information and decentralization, and empirically investigated
the main predictions of this model using three micro-level datasets. In our model, ¯rms delegate
authority to managers, i.e., \decentralize", in order to use the manager's superior information
about implementation of new technologies. Because the interests of the manager and the
principal are not perfectly aligned, such delegation entails a costly loss of control for the
principal. The model predicts that as available public information about the implementation
of new technologies increases, ¯rms should become less likely to decentralize, whereas ¯rms
dealing with new (frontier) technologies should be more likely to decentralize. We also showed
that ¯rms in more heterogeneous environments and young ¯rms are more likely to choose
decentralization. These are intuitive, but quite novel, predictions, and have, to the best of our
knowledge, never been investigated empirically.
We documented that in all three datasets the correlations are consistent with the predictions
of our model. Firms in more heterogeneous environments and those that are closer to the
frontier of their industry are more likely to choose decentralization. Moreover, consistent with
the predictions of the theory, these results are stronger for ¯rms in high-tech sectors. The
results are robust to using UK values to instrument for French heterogeneity and proximity to
frontier, alleviating some of the endogeneity concerns. They are also robust to using alternative
measures of decentralization and heterogeneity. We also found that younger ¯rms tended to be
more likely to decentralize, although this result was less robust when we looked at alternative
33measures of decentralization.
The theory and empirical results taken together suggest that learning and information
accumulation may have important e®ects on the internal organization of ¯rms, and may be es-
pecially important for decentralization decisions. It would be interesting to document the same
issue using data from other countries, and also investigate whether the relationship between
proximity to frontier or heterogeneity and decentralization correspond to the causal e®ects of
the these variables on the internal organization of the ¯rm. Specifying and estimating a more
structural model would be a fruitful approach for this purpose. Finally, our approach suggests
a natural reason for cross-country di®erences in the internal organization of ¯rms; we may ex-
pect less decentralization in developing countries where most ¯rms use well-established (rather
than frontier) technologies. Theoretical and empirical analysis of cross-country patterns of or-
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will become arbitrarily close to 1. We will do this by using the Continuous Mapping Theorem
(e.g., van der Vaart, 1998, Theorem 2.3). First, when x¤
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Proof of Lemma 3
First, we note that the value of the ¯rm admits a recursive representation, so that for s¤ 2 S that
maximizes (3) with starting productivity yi and corresponding history hi
































































In particular, with probability pi, the opportunity to implement the next technology arrives and it





. If it is successfully implemented, yi increases
to °yi, and otherwise it stays at yi. Future probabilities of opportunities and success are una®ected
by these choices or realizations. The resulting optimal policy d¤
i;k in this recursive representation is the
organizational form induced by s¤.
To characterize the form of the value function in (17) and the optimal policy d¤
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maximizes the value of the ¯rm.
The second part of the Lemma follows immediately from the previous analysis.¥
Proof of Proposition 2
The Proposition will be proved using the following three lemmas (which are themselves proved below).
Lemma 4 For all ni
k 2 N and ~ ni





















This lemma states that ¯rms updates their beliefs symmetrically after signals suggesting either L
or R to be the more likely correct action.
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is non-increasing in ".
This lemma states that the posterior that the ¯rm will choose the correct action will be greater
than the threshold for decentralization, ±, if the number of successful L actions in the past are either
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, which is equal to 0. This establishes the proposition.¥
Proof of Lemma 4: The equality follows from the assumption that q0 = 1=2. More formally, equations




















































Proof of Lemma 5: Suppose that there exists ~ ni
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Proof of Lemma 6: Since ~ ni
k is the number of successes out of ni
k in a Bernoulli trial, then holding Q
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A.2 Analysis with Managerial Contracts
In this Appendix, we brie°y discuss the possibility that ¯rms may use incentive contracts to induce
managers to choose the right action. We will show that when B (the bene¯t accruing to the manager
when she chooses her preferred action) is su±ciently large, such incentive contracts will not be optimal.
The intuition is that because managers are credit constrained, incentive contracts give the right incentive
to managers only by transferring rents to them. If B is large, this is not pro¯table for the principal.
Let us assume that the principal decides whether to hire the manager before knowing whether that
Ii(k;t) = 1. Let us also normalize the outside option of the manager to zero, and recall that the
manager is also risk neutral. Given the credit constraints of the manager , the optimal contract takes
a simple form: the principal will pay the manager Byi;t¡1 in case of success. Both when the manager
is unsuccessful in the implementation of the new technology and when there is no new technology to
be implemented, it is optimal for the principal to pay him zero. This contract will induce the manager
39to choose the right action. It will also meet his participation constraint, since the manager will receive
Byi;t¡1 with probability pi± > 0.
The alternative is to pay the manager zero irrespective of success, and let him choose his preferred
action. This contract also meets the manager's participation constraint, since he derives private bene¯ts
from the implementation of the project. This option was the one analyzed in the text. Since the issue
of whether there is delegation or not is only interesting in the case when there is a technology to be
implemented, let us focus on time t such . We then have:
Proposition 4 Suppose that B >
(°¡1)(1¡±)
1¡¯pi° and that Ii(k;t) = 1. Then, for any history hi
k 2 Ht
k, the
optimal strategy for the principal of ¯rm i is not to o®er an incentive contract to the manager.
Proof. Let di;k = 2 denote ¯rm i's decision to delegate control with full compensation to the manager
for choosing the pro¯t-maximizing action at date t on technology k when Ii(k;t) = 1. The value of the












































= [pi(° ¡ B) + 1 ¡ pi] + (20)













Instead, the value of a decentralized ¯rm o®ering the manager a °at wage is Vi (yi;ht








= [pi(±° + (1 ¡ ±)) + 1 ¡ pi] (21)




































B > (° ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ±)
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An upper bound to the future value of the ¯rm can be calculated by assuming that, from period (t+1)
onwards, the ¯rm will innovate successfully whenever a new technology opportunity arises, which takes



























by ¹ A we obtain the su±cient condition
B >












for incentive contracts not to be pro¯table for the principal.
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43Figure 1: Heterogeneity and decentralization



















































1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
- heterogeneity increases
NOTES: The X-axis divides all ¯rms into deciles of heterogeneity from the ¯rst decile (low heterogeneity) to the tenth
decile (high heterogeneity). Heterogeneity is measured by an index of dispersion (the di®erence of the 90th minus the 10th
percentile) of productivity growth between ¯rms in a four digit industry (see text). The Y-axis indicates the proportion of
¯rms that are decentralized into pro¯t centers in the relevant decile group. The sample is the COI sample (3,570 French
¯rms in 1997).
Figure 2: Proximity to frontier and decentralization



















































1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
- proximity increases
NOTES: The X-axis divides all ¯rms into deciles of proximity to frontier (in terms of value added per hours) from the ¯rst
decile (low proximity to frontier) to the tenth decile (high proximity to frontier). The Y-axis indicates the proportion of
¯rms that are decentralized into pro¯t centers in the relevant decile group. The sample is the COI sample (3,570 French
¯rms in 1997).
44Figure 3: Age and decentralization





















































<5 years 5−9 years 10−19 years >19 years
NOTES: Firms are grouped into age bands (dated from the birth of the ¯rm). The Y-axis indicates the proportion of
¯rms that are decentralized into pro¯t centers in the relevant age group. The sample is the COI sample (3,570 French
¯rms in 1997).
Figure 4: Probability of centralization as function of sample size














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































47Table 3: Probability of ¯rm being decentralized
broken down into high-tech and low-tech sectors (Enqu^ ete COI)
Dependent variable Firm decentralized into Pro¯t Centers
Measure of Dispersion of productivity (log Homogeneity) /10
heterogeneity/homogeneity growth in industry IT weighted
Full High- Low- Full High- Low-
sample tech tech sample tech tech
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Heterogeneity 0.251 0.679 -0.062 - - -
(0.115) (0.189) (0.135)
(log Homogeneity) /10 - - - -0.063 -0.098 -0.019
(0.031) (0.048) (0.037)
Proximity to frontier 0.164 0.224 0.103 0.159 0.208 0.104
(0.028) (0.040) (0.044) (0.028) (0.039) (0.043)
Firm age<5 years 0.174 0.215 0.122 0.177 0.214 0.123
(0.041) (0.059) (0.055) (0.041) (0.060) (0.056)
5· Firm age<10 years 0.066 0.069 0.049 0.067 0.068 0.049
(0.022) (0.032) (0.029) (0.022) (0.032) (0.029)
10·Firm age<20 years 0.040 -0.008 0.083 0.041 -0.005 0.082
(0.019) (0.027) (0.028) (0.019) (0.027) (0.028)
Lerner index -0.733 -0.947 -0.547 -0.721 -0.895 -0.544
(0.136) (0.168) (0.218) (0.136) (0.168) (0.218)
Industry dummies yes (73) yes (52) yes (42) yes (73) yes (52) yes (42)
Observations 3,570 1,767 1,803 3,570 1,767 1,803
Log-likelihood ratio test (split) 64.40 (45) 62.08 (45)
(p-value) (0.030) (0.046)
Wald test: Heterogeneity (p-val) - (0.001) - -
Wald test: Homogeneity (p-val) - - - (0.197)
Wald test: Proximity (p-val) - (0.040) - (0.075)
Wald test: Firm age<5 (p-val) - (0.254) - (0.264)
NOTES: Estimation by Probit maximum likelihood with marginal e®ects at the sample means reported (robust standard
errors are below marginal e®ects in brackets); standard errors are also corrected for clustering on four-digit industries.
Industry variables are de¯ned at the four-digit level (except industry dummies at the three-digit level). All right hand
side variables are lagged (and averaged between 1994 and 1997). The de¯nition of \high-tech" is if the ¯rm is in an
industry which has greater than median IT investment per worker; \low-tech" are all other ¯rms. \Log-likelihood ratio
test: Split" tests the equality of all coe±cients between high-tech and low-tech sectors. P-values of tests of whether
individual marginal e®ects at the respective (high-tech and low-tech) sample means are signi¯cantly di®erent between
high-tech and low-tech sectors are given below the log-likelihood ratio test. Heterogeneity is de¯ned as the dispersion of
productivity growth rates within a four digit industry (the 90th percentile less the 10th percentile). The reference for ¯rm
age is \above twenty years". All regressions also include additional ¯rm level controls (log of number of plants, dummy
variable for foreign ownership, log of the ratio of capital to value added, log of ¯rm size - employment, proportion of
workers using new technologies, proportion of high skilled workers, average age of workers in the ¯rm, ¯rm's market share,
¯rm diversi¯cation measure) and industry level controls (log of the ratio of capital to employment, log of the ratio of IT





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































52Table 7: Probability of being decentralized
(British WERS98)
Dependent variable Decentralization of employment decisions
(mean=0.805)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Heterogeneity 0.273 - - - 0.316 -
(95th ¡ 5th percentiles) (0.130) (0.129)
Heterogeneity - 0.540 - - - 0.659
(90th ¡ 10th percentiles) (0.325) (0.312)
Frontier - - -0.051 - -0.204 -0.156
(99th percentile) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Establishment age<5 years - - - -0.076 -0.099 -0.123
(0.115) (0.116) (0.114)
5·Est. age<10 years - - - 0.086 0.055 0.049
(0.081) (0.089) (0.089)
10·Est. age<20 years - - - -0.127 -0.164 -0.173
(0.077) (0.076) (0.075)
Many competitors - - - - 0.127 0.150
(0.082) (0.078)
Few competitors - - - - 0.210 0.228
(0.070) (0.065)
Other ¯rm and industry no no no no yes yes
controls
Industry dummies yes (64) yes (64) yes (64) yes (64) yes (64) yes (64)
Observations 236 236 236 236 236 236
NOTES: These are data from the 1998 British Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS), manufacturing
establishments only. Estimation is by OLS, coe±cients with robust standard errors below (corrected for clustering by
four-digit industry). Dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether \Establishment's manager is able to
make decisions on which sta® to recruit without consulting Head O±ce". Industry variables de¯ned at the four-digit level
(except industry dummies at the three-digit level). Heterogeneity and frontier are averaged between 1994 and 1997. The
reference for establishment age is \above twenty years" and the reference for the PMC indicator is \no competitors". All
regressions include a control for employment size (current, lagged one year and lagged ¯ve years), the proportion of young
workers (under 20 years old), the proportion of older workers (aged over 50 years old), the proportion of unskilled manual
workers and the proportion of part-time workers.
53APPENDICES NOT FOR PUBLICATION FOR
Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion, Claire Lelarge,
John Van Reenen, and Fabrizio Zilibotti
\Technology, Information and the Decentralization of the Firm"
Appendix B
B.1 French Data
COI (\Changements Organisationnels et Informatisation," SESSI)
This is a ¯rm level survey providing information on organization and other ¯rm characteristics conducted
in 1997. It covers manufacturing sectors only (4,153 ¯rms). There are several questions on organizational
design.
ER (Enqu^ ete Reponse 1998; \Relations Professionnelles et N¶ egociations d'Entreprise,"
DARES)
The Enqu^ ete Reponse is an establishment level survey. This contains information about organizational
change between 1996 and 1998. It covers both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors and
is an updated version of the Reponse 1992 survey used by Caroli and Van Reenen (2001). 2,943
establishments of manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors were surveyed with senior managers
being asked questions about industrial relations, organization and other aspects of performance in 1998.
FUTE ¯les (\Format Uni¯¶ e Total d'Entreprises," INSEE)
The FUTE dataset is the key data we use to construct many of the variables used in the paper. FUTE
is constructed from the merging of two datasets, the BRN (\B¶ en¶ e¯ces R¶ eels Normaux") and the EAE
(\Enqu^ etes Annuelles d'Entreprises") , that are then checked rigorously for consistency at INSEE.
The BRN ¯les consist of ¯rms' balance sheets collected annually by the Direction G¶ en¶ erale des
Imp^ ots (Fiscal Administration) and provides ¯rm-level accounting information (value added, capital
investment, wage bills,employment, etc.). This tax regime is mandatory for the companies that have
a level of sales higher than 3.8 million Francs, but can also be also disclosed by smaller ¯rms. These
¯les include around 600,000 ¯rms,44 in the private non-¯nancial, non-agricultural sectors each year
and covers around 80% of total output in the French economy. The EAE survey is conducted by
SESSI (production industries), INSEE (Services and Trade), the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry
of Equipment (Transportation and Construction). The annual survey is mandatory and exhaustive for
¯rms hiring more than 20 workers. It includes a detailed sectoral description of the various activities of
each ¯rm surveyed (the amount of each kind of output).45
DADS ¯les (\D¶ eclarations Annuelles de Donn¶ ees Sociales")
The DADS ¯les consists of yearly mandatory employer reports of each worker's gross earnings subject
to payroll taxes. Hours are also reported since 1993 (but of good quality only since 1994). These ¯les
44630,593 ¯rms in 1996 of which 489,783 report a strictly positive number of workers.
45 Question asked :
\R¶ epartir le chi®re d'a®aires net hors taxes et les exportations directes de votre entreprise selon les di®¶ erentes
activit¶ es conform¶ ement aux nomenclatures o±cielles d'activit¶ es et de produits. Le total du chi®re d'a®aires net
doit correspondre au montant du poste du compte de r¶ esultat. Les reventes en l'¶ etat de marchandises ou de
produits doivent ^ etre d¶ eclar¶ ees dans une ou plusieurs rubriques n¶ egoce."
iinclude around 27 million workers each year (27,535,562 in 1996 after some basic cleaning), which we
aggregate at the plant (1,587,157 plants in 1996) or ¯rm level (1,379,032 ¯rms in 1996) to get information
on the workforce structure (age, gender, skill group in terms of hours worked). We also use the total
hours series necessary for the measures of productivity underlying the heterogeneity and proximity to
the frontier measures (see below).
LIFI Surveys (\Liaisons Financiµ eres," INSEE)
Yearly survey describing the structure of ownership of French ¯rms of the private sector whose ¯nancial
investments in other ¯rms (participations) are higher than 8,000 KF or having sales above 400,000
KF or a number of workers above 500. Firms cited (under control) are also included in the ¯les. All
remaining ¯rms are considered independent.
Even after keeping only ¯rms who are in the COI, BRN, DADS and EAE we are still left with over
90% of the original COI sample (3,751 observations). The ¯rms who we lose tend to be the smallest
¯rms. We loose a few more observations in our regressions due to missing values on the some of the
questions in COI (¯nal sample for regressions is 3,570 observations). For the Reponse sample, we only
keep ¯rms that are part of a larger French or foreign group, but that are not the corporate head quarters
(¯nal sample for regressions is 1,258 observations).
B.2 Variable De¯nitions
The ¯rm and industry level quantitative variables introduced in the regressions are averaged over four
years (COI) if available (three years for Reponse,\Delayering"). Unless otherwise indicated all industry
variables are at the four-digit NACE level.
B.2.1 Decentralization into Pro¯t Centers
Our main measure of decentralization is from the COI. Managers were asked:
Is your ¯rm organized into pro¯t centers ?
The translation of the French de¯nition used in COI is \Organization in pro¯t centers. A pro¯t
center is an enterprise unit that has a margin of budgetary manoeuvre, and therefore some relative
autonomy in their choices (usually it has its own accounting system to measure their pro¯t)."46
We coded the measure of decentralization to be unity if the manager answered\yes"to this question
and zero if the answer was \no".
Using the COI we build a measure of decentralization based on the organization of its business units
into pro¯t centers.47 In practice, once a ¯rm gets beyond a minimal size it faces the choice of retaining
central control or allowing some decentralization. Firms are generally organized into business units and
di®erent ¯rms make decisions about what degree of responsibility to devolve to the managers of these
units. Some ¯rms retain complete command and control at the center, but most create some form of
\responsibility centers" for business unit managers.48 Business scholars delineate three broad types of
responsibility centers (from the most to the least decentralized): pro¯t centers, cost centers and revenue
centers. Our key indicator for decentralization is whether the ¯rm is organized primarily into pro¯t
centers. As its name suggests, when a ¯rm organizes into pro¯t centers a manager is responsible for the
pro¯ts of the unit she manages. In general the pro¯t center manager is given considerable autonomy to
make decisions on the purchase of assets, hiring of personnel, setting salary and promotion schedules
46 In French: \Votre entreprise utilise-t-elle les dispositifs organisationnels suivants?
- Organisation en centres de pro¯t.
Un centre de pro¯t est une unit¶ e de l'entreprise qui a une marge de man¾uvre budg¶ etaire, et donc une relative
autonomie dans ses choix (souvent, un systµ eme de comptabilit¶ e en propre, qui lui permet de mesurer son pro¯t)."
47This follows Janod (2002) and Janod and Saint-Martin (2004).
48 For an introduction to responsibility centers in general and pro¯t centers in particular see, for example:
http://smccd.net/accounts/nurre/online/chtr12a.htm.
iiand managing inventories. A manager of a pro¯t center is concerned with all aspects of the business
that contribute to pro¯tability. Such a manager keeps track of both revenues and costs with the aim of
maximizing pro¯t. As one management specialist puts it:
\The pro¯t center managers frequently know their business better than top management does because
they can devote much more of their time to following up developments in their specialized areas. Hence,
top level managers usually do not have detailed knowledge of the actions they want particular pro¯t
center managers to take, and even direct monitoring of the actions taken, if it were feasible would
not ensure pro¯t center managers were acting appropriately." (Motivating Pro¯t Center Managers,
Merchant, 1989, p.10)
In contrast to a pro¯t center manager, a cost center manager will have the quantity or quality of
output set by someone higher up in the organization. The manager is delegated with some power,
however, in order to try and reduce costs. He will be able to decide on some short-run (but not long-
term) asset purchases, hire temporary and contract sta® (but not permanent employees) and manage
inventories. A revenue center manager has the least autonomy of all.49 She is told to spend a certain
amount of resource and account for revenues but has no (or little) discretion to exceed spending limits.
Inventories are managed but sta® and investments are not acquired unless he is authorized explicitly to
do so.
There are numerous examples from the business literature on the greater autonomy of pro¯t centers.
It is well recognized that organizing divisions into pro¯t centers delegates more power to managers, and
it is generally agreed that a characteristic of companies that organize divisions into pro¯t centers is that
it \allows decision making and power to be delegated e®ectively". Similarly, the ¯rst disadvantage of
pro¯t centers is viewed as \loss of overall central control of the company." 50
Although it is possible in principle for a pro¯t center manager to be monitored on pro¯ts and yet
not be given any powers to a®ect these pro¯ts would seem sub-optimal for the ¯rm (Dearden, 1987,
Merchant, 1989, Bouwens and van Lent, 2004). A pro¯t center manager would be held responsible for
outcomes that he cannot a®ect, so this would de-motivate such managers. Some organizations like this
probably exist - the only way to know more would be to have subjective questions on the degree to
which di®erent pro¯t center managers have greater decision making powers. Even if we had access to
such survey information one might doubt its reliability. The advantage of our pro¯t center variable is
that it is an objective feature of the ¯rm and does not rely on a manager's subjective statement of his
power relative to a senior manager.
In short, we have an indicator equal to unity if the ¯rm is organized into pro¯t centers and a zero
otherwise. So the base group contains ¯rms who are organized primarily into responsibility centers with
less autonomy (i.e. cost and revenue centers) and those ¯rms who have no responsibility centers at all
and maintain command and control. Unfortunately, the data does not allow us to distinguish the latter
groups more ¯nely.
B.2.2 Managerial Autonomy to Make Investment Decisions
In the Enqu^ ete Reponse 1998 the establishment's senior manager was asked how much autonomy from
headquarters she had to make decisions over investment.51 Answers were coded to be one if she answered
that she had \full" autonomy or \important"' autonomy and coded to zero if she had \limited" or \no"
autonomy. This is used as the dependent variable in the last three columns of Table 6. We consider only
49 In fact \revenue center" is rather a misnomer because a notional revenue is assigned by the organization's
controller based on activities and transfer prices. \Expense center" is sometimes used as the manager accounts
mainly for the expenses incurred.
50 These quotes are taken from the educational web-site:
http://www.aloa.co.uk/members/downloads/PDF%20Output/costcentres.pdf
See also Janod (2002).
51 In French: \Par rapport au siµ ege ou µ a la maison mµ ere de l'entreprise ou du groupe, quelle est l'autonomie
de votre ¶ etablissement en matiµ ere d'investissement?
Totale / Importante / Limit¶ ee / Nulle."
iiiestablishments that are part of a wider group (as a single site establishment will not have a separate
headquarters).
B.2.3 Delayering
While COI provides data about the current organization of the ¯rm, the ER dataset provides information
on organizational\changes"(i.e., whether a ¯rm became more or less hierarchical) rather than\levels",
so we use a variation on equation (9) with these data.
Our preferred measure of delayering is from the Enqu^ ete Reponse 1998 where we use the following
question:52
For any of the following technologies and methods, would you tell us whether it is implemented in your
establishment ?
- Shortening of the hierarchical line (delayering of an intermediate hierarchical level).
The indicator used is a dummy variable coded to one if the respondent answered\yes"to this question.
Case study and econometric evidence suggest that delayering is associated with decentralization (Rajan
and Wulf, 2005, Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001).
B.2.4 Proximity to Technological Frontier
Value-added (V Aikt, FUTE) is de¯ned as sales minus purchases of materials. It is de°ated with the
value added price index at the two-digit level (NAF36) available from National Accounts (VA at the
1995 prices)
Total hours (HOURSikt, DADS)
Capital Stock (Kikt, FUTE) is computed from ¯rm level ¯xed assets. This information is registered at
historical cost in the balance sheets. We recover volumes in de°ating the initial measure by the invest-
ment price index (National Accounts) at the date considered minus an estimated age of capital. This
age is calculated as the ratio of depreciated assets over ¯xed assets multiplied by an average equipment
length of life (16 years).
Our Labour Productivity variable is de¯ned as:
yikt = ln(V Aikt) ¡ ln(HOURSikt)
Our TFP variable is de¯ned as:
TFPikt = ln(V Aikt) ¡ ®k ln(HOURSikt) ¡ (1 ¡ ®k) ln(Kikt)
Where ®k is the wage bill share of value added in the four-digit NACE (we also considered an
economy-wide weight of 0.7). We drop ¯rms reporting divergent values of total number of employees in
the FUTE and in the DADS (values greater than double one way or the other). Industries represented
by less than ten ¯rms in the FUTE are also dropped. For each ¯rm (and like other ¯rm level variables
introduced in the regressions) the labour productivity and TFP values are averaged over four years if
available (three years respectively for Reponse, Delayering).
The industry \frontier" (yFkt or TFPFkt) is de¯ned as the 99th percentile (or 95th , or 90th when
speci¯ed) of the obtained series at the NACE four-digit level. The constrained term de¯ned as GAP
y
ikt =
ln(yikt) ¡ ln(yFkt) is a ¯rm level measure of proximity to the technological frontier.
Another alternative measure of distance to frontier is the rank of ¯rms in their industry (the ¯rms
are ranked according to their Labour Productivity in the regressions presented, same qualitative results
with a ranking based on TFP).
52 In French: \Pour les technologies et m¶ ethodes suivantes, pouvez-vous nous indiquer si elles sont utilis¶ ees
dans votre ¶ etablissement ?
- Raccourcissement de ligne hi¶ erarchique (suppression d'un niveau hi¶ erarchique interm¶ ediaire)"
In Reponse, this question about delayering is included in a section entitled \Nous allons maintenant parler de
l'organisation du travail". \Delayering"" is explicitly de¯ned as a \technologie, m¶ ethode (de management)".
ivB.2.5 Heterogeneity Measures
We use the FUTE to construct ¢lnyikt, the ¯rm speci¯c annual productivity growth rate (value added
per hour) for all ¯rms. We average this growth rate for up to three years. We then construct the
percentiles of the inter-¯rm productivity growth distribution within each four-digit NACE sector. The
90-10 is (¢lnyikt)90 ¡ (¢lnyikt)10 where (¢lnyikt)90 is the productivity growth at the 90th percentile
and (¢lnyikt)10 is productivity growth at the 10th percentile. Alternative measures of heterogeneity are
based on other indicators of dispersion of the same series of ¯rm level labour productivity growth rates:
the 95-5 is (¢lnyikt)95 ¡ (¢lnyikt)5, the standard deviation, the standard deviation after trimming
bottom and top 5 % of values in each four-digit industry.
B.2.6 Homogeneity Measures
We use the FUTE ¯les to construct three types of measures.
A ¯rm i is characterized by its vector of kind of productions (sold, l being one of its markets):




























i02N;i06=i cii0 ¢ ITi0
P
i02N;i06=i ITi0
for ¯rm i at time t, with N referring to the sample of ¯rms in the FUTE, and ITi refers to the level of






















where N is the total number of ¯rms in the set N.
The second alternative measure also takes the geographical dimension into account. A ¯rm i is
characterized by its vector of kind of productions in the 21 French administrative regions g:
SR
i = (Si11;:::;Sil1;:::;SiL1 | {z }
region 1
;:::;Si1g;:::;Silg;:::;SiLg | {z }
region g
;:::;Si1G;:::;SilG;:::;SiLG | {z }
region G
)































53Note that the IT investment series (EAE/FUTE) are available in 1996 and 1997.














where R refers to the set of regions. cR























B.2.7 Other Firm Level Variables
All ¯rm level variables are averaged over four years if available.
Lerner Index: de¯ned as (value added minus labor costs) divided by sales. Sourced from FUTE.
Capital Intensity capital stock divided by value added. Sourced from FUTE.
Firm / Plant age: Information available from the SIRENE dataset (reproduced in the DADS) or
from ¯les reporting the yearly creations of ¯rms (Firm Demography Department). Plant age is available
in the Reponse survey.
Joint Stock Firms: Indicator of a ¯rm being a Joint Stock Company (as opposed to smaller and
less anonymous structures, e.g. limited liability ¯rms). Sourced from FUTE.
Under Control: Indicator of whether a ¯rm is part of a larger (French or foreign) group but is not
Head Quarter. Sourced from LIFI.
Foreign Ownership: Indicator of whether a ¯rm is part of a larger foreign group. Sourced from LIFI.
Number of Plants: Number of Plants belonging to each ¯rm (and their region of localization).
Sourced from DADS.
Size: The number of workers at the plant level for Reponse and at the ¯rm level for COI. Sourced
from DADS.
Skills: Share of hours worked by skilled workers at the ¯rm level. We consider as unskilled: Indus-
trial blue collar workers (CS 67, Ouvriers non quali¯¶ es de type industriel); Craftsmen (CS 68, Ouvriers
non quali¯¶ es de type artisanal), Foremen and Supervisors (CS 53, Agents de surveillance), Clerical (CS
55, Employ¶ es de commerce), Personnel of the direct services to the private individuals sectors (CS56,
Personnels des services directs aux particuliers). Others are considered as\skilled". Sourced from DADS.
Worker age: Average age of workers at the ¯rm level (weighted by hours worked). Sourced from
DADS.
viTechnology: A pseudo-continuous variable of proportion of workers using micro-computers is con-
structed from information available in both Reponse 98 (relating to 1998) and COI (1997).
We use the FUTE dataset and the decomposition of the various activities of ¯rms i in terms of
amount of each kind of product l produced and sold (Sil) to construct the following indicators 54:






















This is constructed in the standard way at the industry level (Hl), but note that we weight this
measure if a ¯rm operates in more than one market (by a ¯rm's market share in that sector ( Sil
Si ); so it
has a ¯rm speci¯c component.
Firm level Diversi¯cation Indicator:








B.2.8 Other Industry Level Information
All industry level variables are averaged over three years.
Sector Capital Intensity total capital stock in the four-digit industry divided by total number of
workers in the industry. Sourced from FUTE.
Sector IT Investment: total IT investment in the four-digit industry divided by total number of
workers in industry. Sourced from FUTE.
B.3 UK Data
B.3.1 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS)
WERS 1998 is a survey of establishments in Britain conducted in 1998 (there were also surveys in 1980,
1984 and 199055). It is described in detail in Cully et al. (1999). In one part of the questionnaire
the establishment's senior manager is asked whether she "is able to make decisions without consulting"
Head Quarters. Some of these decisions are relatively minor (such as sta® appraisal). We focus on
whether decisions over sta® recruitment can be made by establishment's management without consulting
someone higher in the corporate hierarchy as this is a key aspect of decentralized decision making
(unfortunately the question on investment decisions used in France was not asked).
54 Notations: Si =
P
l Sil; Sl =
P
i Sil
where ¯rm i sells an amount Sil of product of type l. Note that ¯rms are always i;i
0 and industries h;l.
55The 1984 and 1990 panels were used by Caroli and Van Reenen (2001). There was also a WERS conducted
in 2004 but the four digit industry codes have not yet been released (there are only 12 industry divisions) so we
could not use this for the analysis here which required this level of detail.
viiThis question was only asked if the establishment was part of a larger multi-plant ¯rm. Although
the question was asked to all establishments we have to focus on manufacturing because the ABI data
is only available for services from 1997 onwards so we would not be able to construct a robust measure
of heterogeneity. The WERS data cannot be matched at the establishment-level to Census data so
we are unable to condition on as rich a set of covariates as we can in France. In particular, we do
not have information on value added, pro¯ts or capital. Consequently we cannot include measures
of the establishment's own productivity or Lerner Index in the regression. WERS does contain basic
information on workers demographics (skill, age, female and part-timers) and we condition on these in
the regressions (see Table notes). As a proxy for market power we used the question asked to managers
whether the establishment faces no competitors, some competitors or many competitors (this is the
same as Nickell, 1996).
B.3.2 ABI "Census" Data
To construct the instrumental variables used in the paper we constructed heterogeneity and GAP terms
for each UK four-digit industry to match with its French equivalent. The UK and France share the
European Unions' NACE classi¯cation system so this was straightforward. The only restriction was
that industry averages with cell sizes below 25 are not allowed out of the O±ce of National Statistics
(ONS) so this lead to the loss of a few observations (52 French ¯rms).
Our base dataset is a panel of establishments covering almost all sectors of the UK private sector
called the ABI (Annual Business Inquiry). This underlies many of the UK national statistics and is
similar in structure to the US Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) being a population sample of
large plants and a strati¯ed random sample of smaller plants. The response rates to the ABI are high
because it is illegal not to return the forms to the O±ce of National Statistics (ONS). The ABI contains
all the basic information needed to estimate production functions (gross output, labour, materials,
investment, etc.). For each ¯rm we constructed value per worker and followed the same rules described
for France to calculate heterogeneity (90-10 of productivity growth rates) and the Frontier productivity
(99th percentile). The UK data does not contain information on hours so the UK productivity measure
is cruder than in France.
viiiTable B1: \Enqu^ ete COI" sample, 1994-1997
Variable Source Mean Median St Dev
Heterogeneity measures: Industry level heterogeneity of labour productivity growth
90
th ¡ 10
th percentiles DADS/FUTE 0.275 0.263 0.087
95
th ¡ 5
th percentiles DADS/FUTE 0.443 0.406 0.160
Standard deviation DADS/FUTE 0.177 0.165 0.066
Standard deviation after trimming DADS/FUTE 0.088 0.082 0.033
Homogeneity measure (¯rm level, IT weighted)
Homogeneity, level FUTE 18,821.930 7,564.954 2,699.990
Homogeneity, normalized 0.343 0.138 0.049
log Homogeneity 8.407 8.931 2.381
Distance to technological frontier
Firm labour productivity DADS/FUTE 0.163 0.143 0.089
Sectoral 99
th perc. labour productivity DADS/FUTE 0.508 0.397 0.315
Proximity to frontier DADS/FUTE 0.358 0.334 0.159
log Proximity to frontier -1.125 -1.096 0.457
Other ¯rm level variables
Pro¯t centers COI 0.304 0 0.216
Foreign ownership LIFI 0.173 0 0.143
Under control LIFI 0.502 1 0.500
Joint-stock companies FUTE 0.838 1 0.369
Number of Plants DADS 3.092 1 8.510
Firm age SIRENE 21.658 18 12.740
Capital Intensity ( / VA) FUTE 1.143 0.907 1.036
Number of Workers (Firm) FUTE 323.463 88.375 677.080
% workers working with computers COI 59.669 71.846 26.300
Unskilled workers DADS 27.004 22.623 20.202
Age of workers DADS 38.870 39.010 3.403
Lerner index FUTE 0.075 0.068 0.077
Market share FUTE 1.732 0.404 4.171
Her¯ndahl index FUTE 0.049 0.031 0.057
1 / Her¯ndahl Index FUTE 53.971 31.987 69.721
Specialization FUTE 0.831 0.931 0.203
1 / Specialization (diversi¯cation) FUTE 1.318 1.074 0.499
Other industry level variables
Capital intensity (per worker) FUTE 404.987 289.242 369.064
IT investment (per worker) FUTE 0.849 0.600 0.725
NOTES: 3,570 observations.
ixTable B2: \Enqu^ ete R¶ eponse" sample, 1996-1998
Variable Source Mean Median St Dev
Heterogeneity measures: Industry level heterogeneity of labour productivity growth
90
th ¡ 10
th percentiles DADS/FUTE 0.323 0.298 0.121
Distance to technological frontier
Firm labour productivity DADS/FUTE 0.190 0.154 0.228
Sectoral 99
th perc. labour productivity DADS/FUTE 0.741 0.497 0.837
Proximity to frontier DADS/FUTE 0.323 0.297 0.171
log Proximity to frontier -1.278 -1.214 0.577
Other plant / ¯rm level variables
Delayering Reponse 0.436 0 0.496
Decentralization of investment decisions Reponse 0.484 0 0.500
Foreign ownership LIFI 0.371 0 0.483
Firm age SIRENE 20.586 17 12.816
Number of plants DADS 15.192 4 27.695
Capital intensity (/ VA) FUTE 1.265 0.987 1.312
Number of workers (¯rm level) FUTE 2067 535 4554
% workers working with computers Reponse 37.452 35.000 28.844
Unskilled workers DADS 23.704 14.862 22.420
Age of workers DADS 39.195 39.659 3.713
Lerner index FUTE 0.002 0.057 0.996
Market share FUTE 3.802 1.180 6.258
Her¯ndahl index FUTE 0.044 0.026 0.055
1 / Her¯ndahl index FUTE 68.893 38.820 104.865
Specialization FUTE 0.748 0.801 0.237
1 / Specialization (diversi¯cation) FUTE 1.603 1.248 1.044
Other industry level variables
Capital intensity (per workers) FUTE 445.906 282.757 528.296
IT investment (per worker) FUTE 1.164 0.677 1.460
NOTES: 1,258 observations. All ¯rms are part of a French or foreign group (and are not the corporate head quarters).
xAppendix C: Full sets of Regression Results
In order to keep the Tables clear we have not included the coe±cients on all the controls in the regres-
sions. These are given below for completeness (other results are available from the authors on request).
Table C1 corresponds to Table 2.
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